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RÉSUMÉ 
Les attitudes politiques des membres des  diasporas ont été peu étudiées à ce 
jour;  ce  constat s'applique  tout particulièrement à la  diaspora  soudanaise  (connue 
avant  2011  en  tant  que  diaspora  « nord-soudanaise » ).  Ce  mémoire  présente  un 
portrait des perceptions de la diaspora soudanaise au  Canada en lien avec les conflits 
armés au Soudan, l'implication du gouvernement soudanais et des pays occidentaux, 
de  même que la démocratisation du  pays,  réelle  et  envisagée.  Le mémoire  analyse 
également  les  liens  entre  la  région  d'origine  des  membres  de  la  diaspora  et  les 
opinions  politiques,  posant  l'hypothèse  que  l'affiliation  régionale  est  un  point 
d'ancrage important pour un clivage  attitudinal.  L'hypothèse est  testée  grâce à des 
données d'entrevues recueillies auprès de  quinze membres de la diaspora soudanaise 
au Canada à l'automne 2011 et à l'hiver 2012. 
Les  résultats  confirment  que  l'origine  régionale,  définie  en  termes  de 
territoires marginalisés  et non-marginalisés,  est associée aux attitudes  à l'égard des 
conflits au  Soudan et de certains des acteurs qui y sont impliqués. La plupart de ceux 
qui proviennent de régions marginalisées croient qu'un génocide a eu lieu au Darfour. 
Ils  sont aussi plus nombreux à soutenir une intervention étrangère au  Soudan sous 
une  forme  ou  une  autre  en  2011-2012.  Ceux  qui  proviennent  de  régions  non-
marginalisées  rejettent  pour  leur  part la  notion  de  génocide  et  sont  généralement 
opposés à une intervention extérieure. 
La région d'origine est également liée à la vision du changement politique au 
Soudan.  La  majorité  des  répondants  originaires  de  territoires  non-marginalisés 
invoquent  la  possibilité  d'un  soulèvement  populaire  menant  à  une  transition 
démocratique; certains mettent l'accent sur le rôle de la société civile soudanaise dans 
un éventuel changement de régime, par opposition à toute intervention extérieure. Au 
contraire,  les  interviewés  de  régions  marginalisés  envisagent  une  intervention 
étrangère comme un instrument d'un éventuel changement et ne font pas mention de 
la société civil. 
Les opinions recueillies ne sont pas toujours distinctes en fonction de la région 
d'origine. C'est le cas des perceptions (négatives) à l'égard du rôle du gouvernement 
du  Soudan  dans  les  récents  conflits  et élections.  La  nature  de  l'échantillon  colore 
incontestablement  ces  perceptions;  en  effet,  la  plupart  des  Soudanais  vivant  au Canada  s'y sont  réfugiés  pour  fuir  la  répression;  il  s'agit  également  d'individus 
particulièrement informés  et  engagés politiquement.  En dépit  de  cette  limite,  cette 
étude  nous  permet  de  jeter un  éclairage  inédit  sur les  attitudes  des  Soudanais  au 
Canada. Elle montre également qu'il est fructueux de mettre en œuvre le  concept de 
clivage  dans  un  contexte  de  diaspora,  notamment  lorsqu'elle  est  issue  d'une 
immigration récente. Enfin, ses résultats vont dans le sens des études qui remettent en 
cause  l'ethnicité  comme  principal,  voire  l'unique  facteur  pouvant  expliquer  les 
attitudes politiques des Africains. 
Mots clés : Soudan, diaspora, attitudes politiques, opinions politiques, clivages ABSTRACT 
Political attitudes among diapsoras have rarely been studied, much less among 
the  Sudanese diaspora (those referred to  as  the  Northern Sudanese  diaspora before 
2011).  This  thesis  provides  an  account  of  the  perspectives  of  members  of  the 
Sudanese diaspora in Canada on the subjects of armed conflicts in Sudan, the roles of 
the  Sudanese  government and of Western countries,  and issues  of democratization. 
The thesis also analyses the relationship between the regional origins of members of 
the diaspora and political opintions, posing the hypothesis that regional affiliation is 
an important element of an attitudinal cleavage. This hypothesis was  tested through 
interviews with fifteen members of ~he Sudanese diaspora in Canada, in the autumn 
of 2011 and the winter of 2012. 
The results confirm that region of origin, defined as  origin in a marginalised 
or non-marginalised  region  of  Sudan,  is  related  to  attitudes  regarding  conflicts  in 
Sudan and actors involved in these conflicts. Most of those from marginalized regions 
believe that a genocide took place in Darfur. They were also more likely to  support 
sorne form of military intervention by Western countries were it to have taken place at 
the  time of the interviews. Those  from  non-marginalized regions  tend  to  reject the 
notion of genocide and are generally opposed to Western intervention. 
Region of  origin  also  appears  to  be  linked to  visions  of political change in 
Sudan.  The  majority  of  respondents  from  non-marginalized  regions  invoke  the 
possibility of a popular uprising leading to a democratie transition; sorne speak of the 
role  of sudanese civil society in an eventual change of regime,  often in contrast to 
ideas  of outside intervention. In  contrast, those  from  marginalized  regions  tend  to 
mention foreign intervention  a~ a way that a significant change could take place, and 
make no mention of civil society. 
The  opinions  gathered  are  not  all  differenciated  by  region  of  origin. 
Commonalities include negative perceptions of the role of the government of Sudan 
in recent conflicts and in the 2010 elections. The nature of the sample surely colours 
these  perceptions;  the  majority  of  Sudanese  people  living  in  Canada  arrived  as 
refugees  fleeing  repression.  The  sample  is  also  made  up  of  individuals  who  are 
particularly well informed and  politically active.  Despite this  limitation,  this  study allows us to give a rich account of attitudes among the Sudanese diaspora in Canada. 
It also shows that it is  useful to apply the concept of cleavages to  a diaspora, notably 
among one  made  up  of recent migrants.  Finally,  the  results  can be  situated among 
studies that call into question the centrality of ethnicity as a principal or unique factor 
that can explain political attitudes among African populations. 
Key words: Sudan, diaspora, political attitudes, political opinions, cleavage INTRODUCTION 
It has been increasingly recognized in recent years, by researchers as well as 
by  diplomats  and  politicians,  that  it  is  important  to  consider  perspectives  and 
expertise coming from diasporas, as they often have important roles in the politics of 
their home  countries.  In  relation  to  countries  currently  or  recently  in  conflict,  the 
involvement  of diasporas  in  civil  society,  their  influence  on  the  foreign  policy  of 
certain  host-country  governments,  and  their  role  in  armed  groups  have ·  been 
examined
1
.  Examples such as  the conflict in Northern Ireland and the ami-apartheid 
struggle of South Africa illustrate the relevance of understanding the roles of diaspora 
groups. 
There  are  however  few  works  pertaining  to  the  attitudes  and  opinions  of 
members  of  the  Sudanese  diaspora.  This  is  despite  the  fact  that  many  political 
activities  have  been  organized largely  from  outside  the  country  over the  past two 
decades, due to the repressive political climate and the large portion of the opposition 
that currently supports armed struggle against the regime. Among these few studies, 
only one considers the Sudan diaspora in Canada, and provides only very limited data 
on political attitudes or opinions. 
The size of the Sudanese diaspora in Canada is  difficult to estimate separately 
from the South-Sudanese diaspora. Taken together, adult members of these diasporas 
are  primarily first  generation  migrants  who  arrived  as  refugees  during  the  second 
1  Nafje  Al-Ali  and  Khalid  Koser  (eds.),  2002,  New  Approaches  ta  Migration?:  Transnational 
Communities  and  the Transformation of Home,  Landron, Routledge,  and H. Smith and  P. Stares 
(eds.),  2007,  Diasporas  in Conflict: Peace-Makers  or Peace-Wreckers?  Tokyo,  United  Nations 
University Press. ---- -- ------------------------------------------------------------
2 
Sudanese civil war (1983-2005),  especially later in this  period
2
.  In total,  these  two 
diasporas  are  comprised  of  at  least  15,000  people  in  Canada
3
,  with  other  large 
populations  in  the  USA,  the  UK,  Australia,  and  countries  neighbouring  Sudan, 
especially Egypt in the case of the Sudanese diaspora. 
Through 15  in-depth interviews with members  of the  Sudanese diaspora in 
Canada,  this  thesis  examines  attitudes  with  regards  to  political  issues  in  Sudan. 
Specifically,  the  research  addresses  views  concerning  currently  relevant  subjects 
including  the  question  of whether genocide  has  ta ken  place  (or continues  to  take 
place)  in  Darfur  or  the  Nuba  Mountains. These  conflicts  are  also  more  broadly 
explored through respondents' descriptions of the role that the Government of Sudan 
(GoS)  plays  or  has  played in  them.  The research  also  addresses  attitudes  towards 
potential forms of Western military intervention in Sudan, particularly with regards 
to the dramatic early years of the Darfur crisis and the appeals that have been made 
since that time for interventions such as the establishment of a no-fly zone. Attitudes 
and opinions are also studied in relation to  democratization, including the margin of 
freedom that appeared in the later half of the 2000s, and the potential for a transition 
towards  a  more  democratie  or  more  secular  regime.  Each  of  these  themes  is 
2  Numbers  published by  Citizenship  and  Immigration  Canada show  that  this  population arrived 
primarily  as  refugees.  For years  when such  figures  were  published  (1992,  1994, and  1996  to 
2001) the number of refugees from  Sudan is 77.9% of the  number of new permanent  residents 
from  Sudan.  These same  statistics  show  a  rapid  growth  in  the  number  of new  refugees  from 
Sudan, going from 281 in 1993 to 1038 in 2001. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada,  "Facts 
and Figures," Ottawa, Government of Canada,  1988, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 
2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
3  According to statistics of Citizenship and Immigration Canada,  15,649 new permanent residents 
in Canada between 1988 and 2008 indicated Sudan to be their country of origin. See Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada,  loc. cit., 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992,  1994, 1995,  1996,  1997,  2007  and 
2008.  According  to  the  2006 Canadian Census,  12,640  would respond  to the question of their 
origins  with  "Sudanese"  (and  500  others  with  "Dinka",  a  primarily  Southern  Sudanese  ethnie 
identity, and others with only "African" or "Arab"). See Statistics Canada,  "Cumulative Profile, 
2006  - Large  Urban  Centres  in  Canada  (table),"  2006  Census  of Population,  48  Census 
Metropolitan Areas/Census Agglomerations and Census Tracts (database), via E-STAT, [online]. 
http://estat.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-win/cnsmcgi.exe?Lang=E&arnp;EST-Fi=EStat\English\SC_RR-
eng.htrn (accessed August 12m , 2011). 3 
addressed in  relation to  the  period from  2005  to  mid-2_ 011, which began with  the 
signing  of the  Comprehensive  Peace Agreement (CPA)  and  ended  with  the  2011 
separation of South Sudan. Because this period saw sorne major shifts in the political 
landscape in  Sudan,  a study of views about conflicts, Western interventionism, and 
democratization is  particularly timely.  The  recentness  of these  events  also  insures 
that respondents  possess  sufficient information  about  the  issues  at  hand  and  have 
"meaningful" opinions
4
. 
This study  develops  two  aspects: the  first, more  exploratory  one, describes 
attitudes held by  members of the  Sudanese diaspora in  Canada. The  second, more 
explanatoiy aspect, tests the hypothesis that these attitudes are linked to respondents' 
regional affiliation. More precisely,  the  study hypothesizes  that originating from  a 
marginalized  or  a  non-marginalized  region  of  Sudan  colours  political  attitudes, 
creating  a  cleavage.  Cleavages  are  persistent  divisions  among  citizens  that  shape 
their  response  to  political  issues.  Most  studies  that  use  the  notion  of  cleavages 
examine  voting  behaviour  in  Europe  and  Western  industrialized  democracies. 
However more recent studies have applied the notion to African countries, including 
non-democratie ones
5
.  Socio-demographic charai:teristics related to ethnicity, region, 
or language  are  considered to  define  the  dominant cleavages  in most,  but not all 
African contexts
6
• 
4  Meaningful opinions are different from the "non-attitudes"  that can be  found  when respondents 
lack information or otherwise do not have opinions on a given subject. See Philip Converse, 1964, 
"The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in  Ideo/ogy and Discontent, David Apter (ed.), 
New York, Free Press, p.  75-169. 
5  See for example Kisangani Ezimet, 1999, "Political Cleavages in a Democratizing Society : The 
Case  of  the  Congo  (Formerly  Zaire)",  Comparative  Political  Studies,  vol.  32,  p.  185-228, 
Shaheen  Mozaffar,  James  R.  Scarritt,  and  Glen  Galaich,  2003,  "Electoral  Institutions, 
Ethnopolitical  Cleavages  and  Party Systems in Africa's  Emerging Democracies",  in  American 
Politica/  Science  Review,  vol.  97,  no  3,  p.  379-390,  Lisa  Blaydes  and  Drew  Linzer,  "Losing 
Muslim Hearts and Minds:  Religiosity,  Elite  Competition, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic 
World," paper presented at the Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, April 2009. 
6  James  Scarritt  and  Shaheen  Mozaffar,  1999,  "The  Specification  of  Ethnie  Cleavages  and 
Ethnopolitical  Groups  for the  Analysis  of  Democratie  Competition  in  Contemporary  Africa," 4 
There is a considerable literature which analyzes the divisions that are central 
to  Sudanese politics, often in arder to  explain the root causes or dynamics of armed 
conflicts.  We  do  not daim that the  division between those  from  marginalized and 
non-marginalized  areas  is  the  sole  or  dominant  division  in  Sudanese  politics; 
however, the literature indicates that it is among the most prominent. Scholars have 
documented  this  division  in  relation  to  a  history  of  political  and  economie 
marginalization. The under-representation of those from peripheral areas in all post-
independence regimes is  now well documented,  as  are  patterns  through  which the 
current regime has  aggravated tensions  and conflicts in peripheral regions through 
the  instrumentalization  of  ethna-tribal  politics.  The  continued  patterns  and 
consequences of economie marginalization have also been well documented
7
•  Indeed 
peripheral areas of Sudan, even those that have not been areas of armed conflict, tend 
to score drastically lower on human development indicators. Such inequalities have 
been a commonly cited political grievance. While the divide between marginalized 
and non-marginalized regions of Sudan is well documented, we are unaware of any 
study  that  addresses  whether  political  attitudes,  in  Sudan  or  in  the  diaspora,  are 
related to this division. 
The first chapter of the thesis provides an overview of Sudanese politics and 
recent  history.  The  following  chapter  presents  a  literature  review  beginning  with 
political attitudes in Sudan, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, then turning to the 
limited literature  on the  political engagements  of  diasporas  and  on  politics  in the 
Sudanese diaspora. The final section of the literature review provides an overview of 
scholarship  relating  to  dominant  cleavages  in  Sudan,  including  the  cleavage 
examined by this  thesis  between marginalized and  non-marginalized  regions. The 
Nationalism  and  Ethnie Polities,  vol.  5,  no  1, p.  82-117,  Daniel Posner,  2005,  Instititions  and 
Ethnie Polities in Afriea, Cambridge, Cambridge University press. 
7  See  especially Alex Cobham.  2006,  "Causes  of Conflict  in Sudan:  Testing The  Black Book," 
European Journal of  Development Researeh, vol. 17.  no.'3, p. 465. 5 
theoretical  framework  and  hypothesis  are  _then  presented.  The  methodology  and 
results  are  presented in separate chapters. The concluding remarks  summarize the 
main findings and suggests ways they may be applied. CHAPTERI 
OVERVIEW OF THE SUDANESE CONTEXT 
The  Sudanese context is  rnarked by significant differences in economie and 
social conditions between regions, with particularly difficult conditions in peripheral 
areas, especially those that were or are currently affected by conflict. For exarnple, a 
2009 gross prirnary school enrolrnent rate of 93.8% in Khartoum contrasts to  rates of 
less  than 40%  in  sorne  states  of Darfur and  Eastern  Sudan
8
.  Rates  of rnoderate  or 
severe malnutrition in children are rnuch higher in sorne peripheral states (up to 38%) 
than in sorne central ones (22-25%t With the 2011 separation of South Sudan, loss 
of oil revenues caused the reversai of an earlier trend of rapid economie growth
10
.  By 
the  end  of  2011,  inflation  had  reached  19%,  with  a  projected  real  GDP  negative 
growth rate for 2012 (-7.3%)
11
. 
8  Rates  are  as  law as  36%  in the  Eastern  Sudanese  state  of Red  Sea  and  around  40% in  South 
Darfur.  See Ministry of Welfare and  Social Security National Population Council, 2010, "Sudan 
Millennium  Development  Goals  Progress  Report  2010,"  Republic  of  Sudan,  p.  24  [online]. 
Available  at  http://www.sd.undp.org/doc/Sudan%20MDGs%20Report%202010.pdf  (accessed 
August 28th, 2012). 
9  Khartoum rates are lower than elsewhere, at 22% chronic  malnutrition among  children under five 
in 2006.  Four,  mostly  relatively privileged, central states  have  rates  of 25  or  26%.  Four  other, 
most! y peripheral, conflict affected states have rates between 34 and 38%. See Ministry of Welfare 
and Social Security National Population Council, 2010, loc. cit., p. 19. 
10  With the separation of South Su  dan, the country !ost an estimated 75% of its ail reserves and $1.7 
billion/year in government revenues. See Marina Ottaway and Mai el-Sadany,  2012, "Sudan: From 
Conflict to Cànflict," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, p. 9. 
11  See  International  Monetary  Fund,  2012,  "Statement  at  the  Conclusion  of  an  IMF  Mission  to 
Sudan,"  Press  Release  No.  121193,  May  29,  2012  [online].  Available  at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2012/pr12193.htrn (accessed July 12th, 2012). 7 
Unfortunately, little recent or reliable data is  available to provide an accurate 
summary  of the  ethrto-tribal,  linguistic,  or  religious ·  makeup  of  Sudan,  as  recent 
census data does  not cover such questions
12
•  By the time of independence in 1956, 
Arab ïdentities had been adopted by what seems to  have been a narrow majority of 
Northern  Sudanese
13
.  Non-Arab  populations  are  located  primarily  in  peripheral 
regions  of  Sudan,  including  large  parts  of  the  populations  of  Darfur,  Southern 
Kordofan (includirig the  Nuba Mountains),  Blue Nile,  parts  of Eastern Sudan,  and 
sorne of the most northern areas.  There is  a considerable diversity of languages in 
Sudan, with Arabie as  the  Zingua  franco  of all regions.  Sorne  estimate Sudan to  be 
70% Arab  and  97%  Muslim
14
,  however it is  possible that the  data underlying such 
estimates has been manipulated for political purposes
15
.  Muslim-Christian dynamics 
and  the  persistence of sorne  indigenous systems  of belief have  been prominent in 
political  dynamics  in  the  Nuba  Mountains and  parts  of the  Blue  Nile,  despite  the 
non-Muslim populations of these areas being relatively small. 
12  Recent census data does not caver questions of language, ethnie identity, or religion. See Martina 
Santschi, 2008, "Briefing: Counting New Sudan," African Affairs, vol. 107, no. 429, p.  631-640. 
Such  data  also  seems  ta be  unavailable for  most previous  (1993  or earlier)  censuses.  Scholars 
writing about the ethnie makeup of Sudan tend to quote only the 1956 numbers.  See for example 
M. Daly,  2007, Darfur's Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, p.  179-180, and Deng, 1995, op. cit., p. 401. 
13  As  is common in other texts, "Northern Sudan" and "Northern Sudanese" will be used ta refer ta 
the region that became today's  Sudan, and the  population of this  region. According ta the 1955-
1956  census,  53.3%  of  the  population  of  Northern  Sudan  "reported  that  they  were  Arab  by 
language,  claimed  geneology,  and  assumed  racial  identity."  See  Francis  Deng,  1995,  War  of 
Visions:  Conflict of  Identities in the Sudan. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, p. 401. 
14  See  United  Nations  Development  Programme,  "Sudan  Overview"  [online].  Available  at 
www.sd.undp.org/sudan overview.htm (accessed August 28th, 2012). 
15  See for  example Darfur Relief and  Documentation Centre, 2010,  "5th  Population and  Housing 
Census in Sudan -An Incomplete Exercise"  [online],  available at http://southsudaninfo.net/wp-
content/uploads/reference_library/reports/Sth_population_housing_census_sudan.pdf  (accessed 
August 28th, 2012). 8 
1.1 Pre-colonial and colonial roots of conflicts 
Armed conflicts between central and peripheral regions of today's Sudan, as 
well as  the  conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, have sorne of their origins in · 
earlier dynamics of slave raiding. These raids where the  prerogative of the state in 
the early Sudanic kingdoms and commonly reached into peripheral regions
16
.  Under 
Turko-Egyptian rule, beginning with the invasion of Muhammed Ali in 1820, slave-
raiding  and  slave-owning  increased  dramatically,  with  slaves  being  drawn  "very  . 
largely  from  Southern  Sudan"
17
•  This  period  marked  the  first  time  that  domestic 
slavery  became  "widespread  throughout  all  segments  of  society  in  Northern 
Sudan"
18
.  Increased slavery intensified social stratification, thus lowering the social 
status of non-Muslims and people with certain ethna-racial characteristics: not only 
those from the South, but also from certain peripheral regions of today's Sudan
19
. 
With  the  overthrow  of  Turko-Egyptian  rule  in  1883,  by  the  forces  of  a 
Sudanese religious figure  known as the Mahdi, patterns of exploitation between the 
central state  and  the  hinterlands  continued,  though  slave-raiding and  slave-trading 
started to  decline from the later part of Turko-Egyptian rule, through the  Mahadist 
period, and under subsequent British rule
20
. After the 1898 success of the conquest of 
most of Sudan by Anglo-Egyptian forces, British officiais worked to establish control 
and administrative structures though practices of "native administration" (similar to 
indirect rule) allying themselves with certain tribal and sectarian leaders. This form 
of rule was later applied in Darfur as  well,  after it was annexed in 1916.  Sudanese 
16  See  M.  Daly,  2007,  op.  cit.,  p.  22,  25-26,  and  Douglas  Johnston,  2011,  The  Root Causes  of 
Sudan's Civil Wars: Peace or Truce, Revised Edition, Kampala, Fountain Publishers, p. 4-5. 
17  See Johnston, 2011, op. cit., p. 6. 
18  See Johnston, 2011, op. cit., p.  5. 
19  See Deng, 1995, op. cit., p. 83. 
20  See Robert Collins, 2008, A History of Modern Sudan. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
p. 22-25, 68. 9 
battalions were replenished primarily by conscription, from  "areas which coincided 
with the old slave-raiding zones of the Nuba mountains and Southern Sudan" until 
the  pacification of the  South was· complete and local recruitment of military forces 
replaced these battalions in the 1920s
21
. 
Egypt's  independence  in  1922  led  to  a  sharp  increase  in  British  concern 
about nationalism  and Arab  influence  in  Sudan.  Policies  in  regions  including  the 
South,  Darfur,  and  the  Nuba  Mountains  increasingly  encouraged  the  adoption  or 
preservation  of African  rather  than  Arab  identities  and  customs,  the  use  of  the 
English  language  rather  than  Arabie  (in  Southern  regions),  and  to  sorne  extent 
Christianity or traditional belief systems over Islam in the Nuba Mountains and the 
South
22
.  In  addition, restrictions were imposed on the  movement of people through 
most of the South, Darfur, and other areas through the Closed District Ordinance of 
1924. The  policy aimed to  prevent the  spread of Islam  to  Southern areas  and  the 
Nuba Mountains and to  reduce slave raiding
23
.  The special status of the  South was 
taken even  further  through the Southern Policy of 1930 whereby it was stated that 
the future of the South might ultimately lie with the countries of British East Africa. 
The ideology by which Arab identities, customs, and even tribes were regarded and 
treated as "foreign" had a profound impact in Darfur as well, where many Arab tribes 
were given less land rights and less political representation. 
Differentiai  investment  in  education,  infrastructure  and  economie 
development widened the gap between central and peripheral areas. Darfur and sorne 
other areas  of the  North were in  many ways just as  neglected as  the  South under 
Anglo-Egyptian rule, a trend that continued after independence
24
.  The lion's share of 
21  See Johnston, op. cit., p.  11. 
22  See Deng, op.  cit., p. 82. 
23  See Johnston, 2011, op.  cit., p. 13. 
24  See Daly, 2007, op.  cit., p.  133-44. 10 
colonial economie investments were  made  in  a  part of the  Nile  valley located in 
Northern Sudan.  In  Darfur, colonial policy limited education to  the  sons of chiefs, 
and it was very rarely provided beyond the primary level. In pastoral areas, even the 
sons of "chiefs," a post that was created by the British in many of these areas, were 
not sent to schools until the 1940s
25
. 
1.2 Post-independence regimes and civil war 
In  preparations  for  the  1956 independence  of  Sudan,  Southern  Sudan  and 
other peripheral areas were either grossly under-represented or absent from most key 
negotiations  between  the  British  and  Sudanese  elites.  Efforts  to  create  a  federal 
system or special provisions for  the South and for other regions were unsuccessful, 
and in 1958 the first post-independence Constituent Assembly was dissolved in order 
to  prevent  it from  taking  a  decision  on  the  question  of  federalism.  Instead,  the 
government handed over power to  a military regime under the leadership of Ibrahim 
Abbud, which implemented an  ambitious policy of Arabization and  Islamization of 
the South that resulted, ironically, in increased conversions towards Christianity. 
The  modest and unplanned beginning of Southern guerrilla warfare against 
the Sudanese government came with the Torit mutiny of Southern Sudanese soldiers 
in  1955,  only  months  before  Sudan  became  independent.  From  1960  to  1962,  a 
number of senior Southern political figures went into exile and formed the first well-
organized political movement in conjunction with the small group of guerrillas that 
had been in the bush since the Torit mutiny
26
. 
In a popular uprising known as  the October Revolution, in 1964, the Abbud 
regime ceded power to a transitional government that held elections. In the following 
25  See Collins, 2008, op. cit., p. 42, 55. 
26  See Collins, 2008, op.  cit., p. 77-80. 11 
five-year period of precarious coalition governments, ali dominated by Northerners, 
the  civil war proceeded with growing intensity.  Southern Sudanese in the  National 
Assembly  continued  to  press  for  federalism  and  the  devolution  of  sorne  powers, 
often in alliance with marginalized areas of the North, but were repeatedly defeated 
by Northern-based political parties. 
In  a 1969 coup, Jafar Nimairi, an  army colonel from  Northern Sudan,  took 
power and immediately announced that the war in the  South would be  solved by 
political rather than military means, eventually signing the Addis Ababa Agreement 
of 1972 and bringing about a decade of relative peace. The abrogation of the Addis 
Abeba agreement by the Nimairi government and the imposition of Sharia law,  bath 
in  1983,  are  the  most often  cited  causes  of the  formation  of  the  Sudan  People's 
Liberation Army/Movement (SPLAIM?
7  and the return to  civil war later that year. 
The  SPLAIM,  composed  primarily  of  Southern  leadership  and  troops,  always 
claimed to be fighting for a united, democratie Sudan in which marginalized regions 
would together form a majority. They consistently denied that they were fighting for 
an  independent South Sudan. They eventually made significant inroads in  parts  of 
Northern Sudan; they controlled territory for many years and recruited heavily in the 
Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, primarily among non-Arab groups. They also fought 
in alliance with rebel movements in Eastern Sudan. 
Another change of regime came in April 1985, when popular unrest in urban 
areas of the  North led to  a military takeover that ended the  Nimairi regime. During 
the  subsequent  four-year  period  of  coalition  governments,  three  political  parties 
shared power, including the two that had been dominant for decades, the Democratie 
Unionist Party (DUP), and the National Umma Party (NUP), as well as the relatively 
27  While sorne refer to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, the political party, as separate from 
the Sudan People's Liberation Army, the former guerrilla army,  bath always shared the same top 
leadership. Like many authors, we will refer to  the  SPLAJM, as  in most cases it is not useful to 
make a distinction. 12 
new National Islamic Front (NIF), the party of Sudan's Muslim Brotherhood. These 
parties included few representatives from marginalized areas among their leadership. 
The war intensified quickly in the 1980s, particularly following a government 
decision  to  arm  militias  made  up  primarily  of  Baqqara  youth  (from  the  cattle-
hearding,  seasonally  nomadic,  Arab  tribes  living  close  to  and  crossing  over  the 
North-South boundaries). These militias carried out a long series of extremely brutal 
attacks on villages in Bahr-el-Ghazal, a neighbouring state of Southern Sudan
28
. The 
SPLAJM  nonetheless  had  more  military  victories  than  defeats  in  the  1980s, 
eventually controlling  most  areas  of the  South  outside  of  major  towns, including 
sorne parts of the Nuba Mountains and Southerh Blue Nile. 
1.3 Recent changes and the current political context 
Still  having  only  modest  oil  revenues,  Sudan  had  become  the  third  most 
indebted  country  in  the  world. After  a  1989  IMF  deal  to  inject  money  into  the 
country,  conditional  on  the  elimination  of  subsidies  and  the  devaluation  of  the 
currency,  inflation spiralled out of control, as  protests  and riots shook the cities. At 
the same time, the  GoS  indicated significant willingness to  negotiate an  end to civil 
war with the SPLAJM, most crucially by repealing significant aspects of Sharia law 
or limiting its application
29
• In response, the NIF and a group of army officers staged 
a coup that installed Omar al-Bashir as president, a post he continues to hold. 
1.3.1 Radical Islamist rule (1989-1999) 
The NIF  consolidated power using far more brutal means than  ever before 
28  "They would attack a Dinka village at dawn, kil!  ali  adult males  who could not escape,  rape the 
women, and enslave the children. The village would be burned, the wells stuffed with dead Dinka 
males, schools and clinics destroyed  ... " See Collins, 2008, op. cit., p. 176. 
29  See Johnston, 2011, op.  cit., p. 84-85 13. 
seen  in  Sudan.  Hundreds,  if  not  thousands,  of  journalists,  lawyers,  professors, 
intellectuals and human rights activists were tortured, disappeared, or are known to 
have  been  executed.  Even  relatives  of  those  in  the  opposition  saon  faced 
considerable brutality. In addition, Sharia law was applied in a more fundamentalist 
fashion whereby public floggings, amputations, and executions became common for 
the first time. Thousands of women and many others were dismissed from the civil 
service,  police,  and  judiciary.  Political  parties,  non-government  media,  and  most 
unions were banned. Large numbers of Sudanese left the country
30
. 
The new regime intensified the  war in  the  South. In front-line  areas of the 
North-South conflict, the ideological fervour of the regime led to even more extreme 
attempts  at  Islamization  and  Arabisation.  Ideas  of  jihad,  of  mujahadeen  holy 
warriors,  and  of  the  righteousness  of  killing  non-Muslims  (and  Muslim  rebels) 
received widespread promotion by the  regime
31
.  The brutality  of attacks  and  their 
racial and religious dimensions received particular international attention in relation 
to  the  Nuba  Mountains,  where  even  before  al-Bashir  seized  power,  the  previous 
regime  had  already  begun  to  implement  a  policy  of  systematically  killing  local 
leaders and any educated Nuba from certain areas
32
. Whether such crimes and those 
in other regions constitute genocide has been the subject of debate
33
. 
Sudan stated its support for Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War and began 
actively  encouraging  armed  Islamist  extremist  groups  to  spread  their  revolution 
throughout  the  Muslim world by  any  means  necessary. Groups  from  all  different 
30  For the events summarized in this paragraph, see Collins, 2008, op. cit., p. 192-187. 
31  See  Sandra  Hale,  2001,  "Testimonies  in Exile:  Sudanese  Gender Politics."  Northeast African 
Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, p. 97, and Johnston, 2011, op. cit., p. 132-133. 
32  Johnston, 2011, op. cit., p.  132. 
33  See for  example Alex de Waal,  1995, "Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan," London: African 
Rights  [online].  Available  at  http://sudanarchive.net  (accessed  July  14th,  2010).  348  p.,  and 
Johnston, 2011, op. cit., p. 132 14 
parts  of Africa,  Arab  countries,  and Afghanistan,  most  prominently  including  al-
Qa'ida  operatives  from  a  dozen  countries,  were  welcomed to  come  and  go  from 
Sudan as they pleased, were provided resources, and were allowed to set-up training 
camps. African, Arab and Western countries nearly all became increasingly hostile to 
the NIF regime and to sorne extent supportive of the SPLAJM
34
• 
1.3.2 Changes in the regime and the oil bo.om 
The political situation in Sudan changed considerably at the end of the 1990s. 
A  power  struggle  between  al-Bashir  and  long-time  NIF  leader  Hassan  al-Turabi 
resulted in the reorganization of the NIF into the National Congress Party (NCP) and, 
in  December  1999,  the  removal  of  al-Turabi  from  positions  of  power  and  the 
marginalization  of  his  supporters
35
.  Al-Turabi  later  formed  the  Popular  Congress 
Party, an  Islamist political formation  that  rivais  the  NCP,  and  has  become one  of 
Sudan's most powerful opposition parties. State power became concentrated among a 
small group  described by sorne as  concerned only with the  elimination of security 
threats to the regime and consolidation of their vast political and economie powers
36
. 
From  this  point onwards,  the  regime  has  adopted  and  implemented less  Islamist-
inspired laws.  Sorne believe that the regime also distanced itself from  international 
terrorist  groups
37
,  though  multiple  Israeli  strikes  on  Sudanese  territory  seem  to 
suggest otherwise. The civil war continued unabated throughout these shifts. 
34  The most notable exception was the post 1991 Ethiopian government, which had come into power 
by toppling the Mengistu regime using considerable Sudanese government support.  Mengistu had 
frequently used SPLAJM forces against rebel groups. See Johnston, 2011, op.  cit., p. 87-90. 
35  It is common ta refer ta al-Turabi as having been even more powerful that al-Bashir himself over 
a number of years. A number of the regime's Islamist efforts were al-Turabi's initiatives, and when 
he  first  came  into  conflict with  al-Bashir,  it  seemea for  sorne  time  that  he  was  able  ta  out-
manoeuvre al-Bashir and ta exert greater influence  on  the  actions  of the  regime.  See  Collins, 
2008, op.  cit., p. 218-228. 
36  See International Crisis Group, 2011, op. cit., p.  13. 
37  See for example Johnston, 2011, op. cit., p. 216. 15 
Sudan's  economie  situation also  changed remarkably when in 1999, the  ail 
pipeline was  completed from near the  North-South boundary to  Port Sudan, in  the 
north-east, resulting in an enormous growth in ail revenues
38
. While new funds were 
largely spent on arms, and while accusations of widespread corruption are  common, 
the country was nonetheless able to stabilize its economy, to  invest in infrastucture, 
and to  pay for imports  of electricity,  food, and other goods. It seems however that 
even outside of war-zones, little money reached peripheral regions
39  or even most of 
those in central regions, thus exacerbating tensions. The contoversial building of the 
Merowe dam also added to conflicts. 
1.3.3 Relations between the Sudanese government and Western countries 
Sudan was  once  considered an  ally  of Western  governments. The Chadian 
civil war of the early 1980s is considered by many to have been an internationalized 
conflict between Libya and the West, with Sudan as  a Western ally supporting  the 
Chadian  regime
40
.  However  relations  between  the  Sudanese  government  and  the 
West worsened from  the mid-1980s until the late 1990s, initially in response to  the 
arming of Baqqara militias and the rapprochement between Sudan and countries such 
as  Libya  and  Iran,  and  later  in  reaction  to  the  policies  of  the  NIF  regime
41
. 
Significant  Sudanese  connections  to  the  1995  assassination  attempt  on  Egypt's 
president  Hosni  Mubarak,  and  subsequent  refusai  to  condemn  the  attempt  or 
extradite  suspects,  further  worsened  the  regime's  relationships  with  most  foreign 
governments. A few  weeks after  the  1998 destruction of US  embassies  in Nairobi 
38  Oil  production went  from  around  ten thousand  barrels of ail  per day  in the mid-1990s ta  512 
thousand barrels per day in 2006. See Collins, 2008, op. cit., p.  232, 236. 
39  Collins, 2008, op. cit., p. 238. 
40  See Johnston, 2011, op.  cit., p.  139-140, and Mahmood Mamdani, 2010, Saviours and Survivors: 
Darfur, Poli  tics and the War on Terror, New York, Verso Books. 
41  See Johnston, 2011, op. cit., p. 60. 16 
and Dar es-Salam by al-Qa'ida, the Americans launched a cruise missile attack that 
destroyed Sudan's Al-Shifa chemical and pharmaceutical plant
42
. 
After the  marginalization of al-Turabi and  his supporters, relations between 
Sudan and the West changed considerably.  Egypt brokered a rapprochement between 
Sudan and the USA in 1999, leading to significant cooperation between the Sudanese 
security  apparatus  and  the  CIA 
43
•  After  9/11,  the  American  government  made 
considerable efforts to increase security cooperation, though the American Congress 
saon made it clear that sanctions would only be lifted in response to  considerable 
efforts towards peace between North and South
44
• Later, with an important agreement 
already signed towards a coming peace between the GaS and SPLA/M,  the dramatic 
early  years  of the  war in Darfur removed  the  possibility  that  the  USA would lift 
sanctions.  The  Americans  continued  to  provide  millions  in  assistance  to  the 
SPLA/M
45
. 
1.4 Peace between North and South and civil wars in today's Sudan 
The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the SPLA/M and 
the  GaS  led  to  a six-year interim period in which South  Sudan was  by almost all 
measures independent of the  North. This interim period had the stated objective of 
42  The Americans claimed that the plant was  producing a nerve gas, however such evidence  was 
later shawn to  be  dubious at best.  Less than a year Jater, the American government unfroze  the 
assets of the owner of the plant. See Collins,  2008, op.  cit., p.  239. 
43  See International Crisis  Group,  2011, "Divisions in Sudan's Ruling Party and  the Threat to  the 
Country's Stability" [online], p. 12, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-
of  -africa/sudan/17 4-divisions-in -sudans-ruling  -party  -a nd-the-threat  -to-the-coun trys-fu  ture-
stability.aspx (accessed July 14th, 2010). 
44  Only weeks after 9/11, the US  lifted the UN travel ban on members of the Sudanese government 
and  Salih  Gosh,  major-general  and  head  of  the  National  Security  Service,  was  appointed  to 
"expand and coordinate anti-terrorist intelligence with the Americans." In the following year the 
US  Congress passed the Sudan Peace Act, which increased pressure on Sudan, to the displeasure 
of the NIF.  See Collins, 2008, op. cit., p. 241-242. 
45  Collins, 2008, op. cit., p. 239. ,------ --
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providing time for the GoS (now with considerable participation by the SPLA/M and 
opposition parties, but with al-Bashir still in firm  control) to  make unity attractive 
before the referendum in the South on the question of separation. In reality,  very few 
substantive  reforms  occurred. The  Nuba  Mountains  and  the  Blue  Nile  were  only 
promised "popular consultations" on the question of whether they wished to be part 
of the North or the South, resulting in no significant change. 
Aside  from  the  referendum, key provisions of the  CPA included lifting the 
long-standing state  of emergency,  50/50  sharing of oil revenues during the interim 
period, and the application of Sharia law only in Northern Sudan. The 2010 election 
was also a result of the CPA,  and led to  official results whereby very few non-NCP 
candidates were elected at any level in Northern Sudan, except in  the state of Blue 
Nile and in sorne parts of the Nuba Mountains. lt was marked by boycotts of sorne of 
the main opposition parties and was described, among other things, as being "marred 
by [  ... ] untraceable  results  that challenged [its]  credibility"  by election observers
46
. 
However it was only in relation to  Darfur that a monitoring team went so far  as  to 
declare that the results "can not be seen as credible"
47
. 
Turning to the war in Darfur, it is important to begin with a brief summary of 
recent history of that region. The abolition of the native administration structures in 
Darfur  in  the  1970s  came  at  a  time  of  declining  rainfall  and  considerable 
desertification. In addition, the Chadian civil war of the early 1980s and the Chad-
Libya war of 1986-87 brought not only arms  to  different groups in Darfur, but also 
46  The above  quote  is  from the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM)  report. 
The  Carter  Centre  reported  similar  concerns.  See  EUEOM,  2010,  "Sudan,  Final  Report: 
Executive  and  Legislative  Elections,  11-15  April  2010,  p.  7  [online].  Available  at 
http :/  /www.eueom.eu/files/dmfile/final-report-eu-eom-sudan-20  1  O_en.  pdf  (  accessed  J  uly  25th, 
2012), and Carter Center, 2010 "Observing Sudan's 2010 National Elections," Atlanta, The Carter 
Centre,  2010  [online].  Available  at  http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/sudan-041710.html 
(accessed July 25th, 2012). 
47  See Carter Centre, 2010, loc.  cit. p. 4. 18 
militant, pan-Arab mobilization
48
. The two largest conflicts in Darfur since that time 
have  followed  similar  Arab/non-Arab  lines
49
.  Severe  droughts,  ongoing 
desertification,  and  the  Sudanese  government's  provision  of  arms  towards  Arab 
groups have further  aggravated conflicts
50
.  The  NIF regime increased favouritism, 
military support, and impunity for most Arab tribes,  particularly after the  SPLAIM 
attempted (unsuccessfully)  to  gain  a  foothold  in Darfur in  1991
51
.  Extreme,  racist 
dimensions of the pan-Arab mcibilization in Darfur have been fairly common
52
• 
Conflict in Darfur reached an unprecedented scale in 2003-2004, when two 
rebel groups (formed among certain non-Arabs groups) declared their existence and 
attacked  Sudanese  military  targets.  The  government  organized  militias,  sent  its 
armed  forces,  and  carried  out  a  massive,  scorched-earth  campaign
53
.  Though  the 
conflict  diminished  in  intensity  in  2005,  it  continued  to  result  in  large-scale 
displacement and violence until around 2010. Since then, it can be viewed as a series 
48  See Johnston, 2011, op.  cit., p. 139-141. 
49  Namely,  the  Arab-Fur  conflict  of  1988-1989  and  the  war  in  Darfur  from  2003  until  2010. 
Nonetheless,  many Arab  and non-Arab groups  have refrained  from  aligning themselves in such 
ways. The ongoing conflict in Darfur since 2010 is also fairly different, with significant conflicts 
among Arab  groups  and  among non-Arab groups.  See  Claudio  Gramizzi  and  Jérôme Tubiana, 
2012,  "Forgotten Darfur: Old Tactics and  New Players," Geneva,  Small Arms  Survey [online]. 
Available  at  http://smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SWP-28-Forgotten-Darfur.pdf 
(accessed August 28th, 2012). 
50  See Flint and de Waal, 2008, op.  cit., p. 36-40, 56-70 and Daly,  2007, op.  cit., p.  263-269. 
51  For example, the reform of sorne structures of government and representation within Darfur in the 
· 1990s,  and  changes  in  Darfur's  representation  in  the  national  government,  were  perceived  by 
many as favouring Arab tribes over non-Arab ones. See Daly, 2007, op. cit., p.  262-264. 
52  See  Abdullahi  Osman  El-Tom,  2010,  "Appendix  K:  Arab  Congregation  (Gathering)  and  the 
Ideology of Genocide in Darfur, Sudan," in  Salah Hassan and Carina Ray,  Darfur and the Crisis 
of Governance in Sudan, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, p. 448-467. See also Flint and de Waal, 
2008, op. cit., p. 47-115. 
53  An estimated 1.85 million people were systematically displaced during between 2004 and 2006. 
The number of people who died over the first two years of the conflict is  above 100,000 by most 
credible estimates, with most deaths being attributed to dehydration and disease. See Government 
Accountability Office, 2006, "Darfur Crisis: Death Estimates Demonstrate Severity of Crisis, but 
Their  Accuracy  and  Credibility  Could  Be  Enhanced,"  Washington  [online].  Available  at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0724.pdf (accessed July 12th, 2010). 
·--------, 19 
of interlocking low-intensity conflicts, including considerable  fighting  among Arab 
military  groups  as  well  as  between  the  government  and  rebel  groups. The  large 
United  Nations  - African  Union  Mission  in  Darfur  (UNAMID)  has  been  present 
since  2007
54
.  Most  displaced  people  have  yet  to  return  home,  due  to  security 
concerns,  land  seizures,  and  other  issues  associated  with  the  lack  of  a  political 
settlement. 
The return to war in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile came in 2011, when 
fighting  resumed  between  the  GoS  and  SPLM-North
55
,  whose  troops  have  never 
been disarmed  following  the  1983-2005  civil  war.  The  conflict started  after  NCP 
incumbent candidate Ahmed Haroun was  re-elected for  the  governorship  of South 
Kordofan (the state that includes the Nuba Mountains). The SPLM-North leadership 
rejected  the  results  as  fraudulent,  and  violence  saon spiralled  out  of control.  The 
SPLM-North  has  since joined with the  largest rebel  groups  in  Darfur  to  form  the 
Sudanese  Revolutionary  Forces  (SRF), who  call  for  the  overthrow  of  the  current 
regime.  The  SRF  is  thought  to  receive  considerable  support  from  South  Sudan
56
. 
Most  of  Sudan's  largest  political  parties  have  now  signed  a  separate  agreement, 
calling for the overthrow of the current regime through a peaceful uprising
57
. 
54  It replaced the African Union  Mission in Sudan, which began in  2004 and  had most of its troops 
deployed in 2005. 
55  The SPLAIM had a fairly centralized leadership structure for decades.  However, especially after 
the January 2011  referendum on the separation of South  Sudan, it became clear that the SPLM-
North was  becoming an autonomous  entity,  bath as  a Northern  political  party and  as  a sizable 
military formation. 
56  For  example  anonymous  comments  attributed  to  a  US  official  have  alleged  South  Sudanese 
support for SPLM-North. See Sudan  Tribune, "South Sudan  Kiir 'Apologises' to  US  Obama for 
Denying  his  Support  to  Sudanese  Rebels,"  4  August  2012  [online].  Available  at 
http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-Kiir-apologises-to-US  (accessed August 23rd, 2012). 
57  The agreement includes  the  NUP,  the  PCP,  the  Sudanese Communist Party,  and  a  number of 
smaller political parties. The SPLM-North, now banned as a political party, and  the DUP are the 
only large opposition parties that did not sign the agreement,  the later having joined a coalition 
government with  the  NCP  in  late  2011  (a  coalition  to  which  the  NUP  was  also  invited,  but 20 
North-South  military  confrontations  have  occurred  on  sorne  occasions  in 
recent  years.  Most  notably,  after  months  of disputes  over the  pipeline  costs,  the 
Government  of South  Sudan stopped  the  flow  of Southern  ail  through  Sudan in 
2012, a move that cast South Sudan approximated 98% of its total domestic revenues 
(until  a  deal  was  reached  in  Septernber  of  the  sarne  year)
58
.  In  April  2012,  the 
Southern Sudanese Armed Forces seized the Heglig ail fields,  holding them for ten 
days  and  claiming them  to  be part of South  Sudan,  despite  the  SPLA/M having 
previously accepted a Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that placed the fields on 
the N  orthern si de of the border. 
In  surnmary,  Sudan  continues  to  experience  arrned  conflicts  between  the 
governrnent and rebel groups in several peripheral regions, linked to  sorne extent to 
ongoing tensions between Sudan and South Sudan. In addition, Eastern Sudan (part 
of today's Sudan) has only recently ernerged from conflict. In each of these regions, 
historical tensions regarding the distribution of resources and the political dominance 
of  an  elite  from  a  particular  part  of  the  North  have  been  exacerbated  by  the 
mobilization  of  government  militias  rnainly  among  Arab  tribes  and  of  the 
mobilization of rebel groups rnainly arnong non-Arab ones. 
.  declined to participa  te). 
58  South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics, 2011, 2010 Statistical Yearbook, [online]. Available at 
http://ssnbs.org/storage/South%20Sudan%20Statistical%20Yearbook%202011 %20FINAL.pdf 
(accessed August 29th, 2012). CHAPTERII 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Political attitudes have been studied primarily in relation to countries that are 
at least somewhat democratie, where attitudinal data can be linked to voting patterns. 
In  Western  democracies,  public  opinion,  often  examined  in  tandem  with  voting 
behaviour,  has  become  a  subfield  of  political  science  in  its  own  right.  Works 
pertaining  to  political  attitudes  and  behaviour  in  Africa  are  less  numerous  but 
nonetheless touch on a variety of topics. While rigourous and representative political 
attitude surveys are considered by many to be impossible in countries of very limited 
political freedoms
58
,  even more so  in  areas  of conflict, comparative survey data has 
been recently become available for an increasing number of North African countries, 
beginning  with  Algeria,  Morocco,  and  Egypt  in  the  early  2000s.  In  2012,  more 
extensive data was released,  which also included Sudan and Tunisia
59
.  The relative 
paucity  and  recentness  of  data  about  Sudan  leads  us  to  discuss  academie  works 
related to  political attitudes in sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa,  the  later being 
often studied as part of the Arab world or the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region. 
58  Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessier, 2008, "Attitudes in the Arab World," Journal of  Democracy, vol. 
19, no. 1, p. 434. 
59  The World Values  Survey has  included Algeria,  Morocco  and Egypt since the  early 2000s. The 
Arab Barometer first round, in  2006,  included Algeria  and  Morocco,  and  the second  round, in 
2010,  also  included Egypt, Sudan,  and Tunisia.  The Arab  Opinion Index  covered ali  the  above 
mentioned countries in 2011. 22 
This literature review firs't presents studies that analyze available survey data 
pertaining to  governments and democracy in the region and in (or about) Su dan. The 
second  section  briefly  reviews  literature  on  the  links  between  diasporas  and  the 
politics  of  the  countries  of  origin,  including  questions  of  opinions  and  political 
behaviours  of  members  of  these  diasporas.  The  third  section  looks  at  dominant 
patterns in the politics of African countries, especially regional affiliation, ethnicity, 
and religion. These are the three elements which, according to  many scholars, most 
often explain attitudes  and political behaviours on  the  continent. Fortunately,  these 
factors  have  been studied in the  Sudanese context, which will be described in the 
final sub-section. 
2.1 Attitudes towards democracy, regimes, and institutions in sub-Saharan 
Africa, North Africa, and in Sudan 
Attitudes  towards  democracy  have  been  a  key  element  of  multi-country 
surveys conducted in Africa.  Questions commonly address preferences for  different 
types of regime (indu  ding more autocratie options) and attitudes towards particular 
institutions such as  the government, the army, and political parties. Satisfaction with 
and trust for regimes is also often covered, as are a couple specifie events or policies 
which will be  discussed  briefly.  Of particular  significance  are  the  Afrobarometer 
surveys,  which  conducted  their  first  round  in  1999  in  a  number  of  sub-Saharan 
African countries, and the Arab Barometer surveys which covered two North African 
countries in 2006, and four in 2010. The Afrobarometer surveys focus  on countries 
that have  "recently experienced political  and  economie reforms"
60
,  while  the Arab 
Barometer surveys include sorne countries with more authoritarian regimes. 
60  The Afrobarometer sample countries geographically closest to  Sudan are Uganda and Kenya to 
the  South,  and  Mali  and  Nigeria  to  the West.  The  countries  included  are  those  which  have 
"opened up  politically and economically in  the last couple of decades,"  though they do  include 
countries with more autocratie regimes such as Zimbabwe and Lesotho. See Bratton, Mattes, and 
Gyimah-Boadi, 2005, op. cit. Table 2.1 
Rule by a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament 
or elections would be "very good" or "good" (percentage agreeing) 
Nigeria  43% 
South Africa  37% 
Uganda  31% 
Tanzania 
1  29% 
Zimbabwe  27% 
Morocco  18% 
1 
Egypt  8% 
Source: World Values Databank, 2000 and 2001. 
23 
"Wide but shallow" popular support for democracy bas been observed in sub-
Saharan Africa, where almost all (93%) of tho se interviewed in the first round of the 
Afrobarometer "reject at least one  form  of autocracy,  that is  either military rule  or 
one-man rule or one-party rule" but only 59% reject all three forms. In addition, only 
48% reject all three forms and also indicate support for democracy
61
.  In sub-Saharan 
Africa, there is particularly strong support for "having a strong leader who does not 
have to  bother with parliament or elections," which is  significantly less popular in 
the  North African countries  surveyed,  as  indicated in Table  1 and  complementary 
data
62
.  Support for  democracy in  sub-Saharan African tends  to  be  stronger among 
those who are  more educated,  have higher socio-economic status,  or live in urban 
areas
63
. 
In North Africa and the broader Arab world, sorne indicators of support for 
61  Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005, op.  cit., p. 90-91. Emphasis in original. 
62  The Arab Barometer surveys  asked the  same question  and  similarly found  rates  below 20% in 
Algeria and Morocco in the first round, and in  Sudan in the second round. See Arab Barometer, 
loc.  cit., and van den Bosch, 2012, loc. cit., p.  39. Other second round data for North Africa is  not 
yet available in English. 
63  Geoffrey Evans and  Pauline Rose, 2012,  "Understanding Education's Influence  on  Support for 
Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of Development Studies, vol. 48, no. 4, p. 498-515. 24 
democracy are  quite strong, including majorities in  all  countries surveyed agreeing 
that democracy, despite its problems, is better than any other form of government
64
. 
Similarly,  on  most  other  indicators,  popular  support  for  democracy  and 
understandings of democracy are about as strong in the Arab world (including North 
Africa) as in other world regions
65
• There is however sorne data that indicates lower 
levels of support for democracy, especially in relation to  preference for certain forms 
of government that substitute elements of Islamic law for elections, or restrict secular 
political options. For instance, in Algeria, support for "a system governed by Islamic 
law  without  elections  or  political  parties" was  found  to  be  "very  appropriate"  or 
"appropriate" by 42.4% of respondents,  compared to  52.6% for  a system which in 
bath secular  and  religious  political parties  are  allowed  to  compete
66
.  It  should be 
noted however that, as  Mark Tessier argues, the most significant attitudinal divide in 
Arab  countries is  not between those who favour  democracy and  those who favour 
other, Islamic-influenced forms of government; rather, is "between those who favour 
secular democracy and those who favour a political system that is  bath democratie 
and  Islamic  in  sorne  meaningful way"
67
.  His  analysis  of the Arab  Barometer data 
shows  few  generalizable differences  in  political culture between these  secular and 
64  Rates surveyed in the World Values Survey indicate nearly unanimous agreement on this point in 
Egypt  and  Morocco  (98%  and  96%),  as  compared  to  88%  agreeing  or  strongly  agreeing  in 
Algeria. See World Values Survey Databank, multiple years, loc.  cit.  However, data from  the Arab 
Barometer and the Arab Opinion Index show rates not nearly as high, with values for Morocco of 
85% and  68% in  these  other two  sources,  and  values  for  Algeria  of 69%  and 56%.  See Arab 
Barometer, 2006, "Arab Barometer II:  Sudan Country Report," Cairo, Arab Barometer, and Arab 
Centre for  Research and  Policy  Studies,  2012,  "The  Arab  Opinion Project:  The Arab  Opinion 
Index," Doha, Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, p. 39. 
65  Fares Braizat, 2010, "What Arabs Think," Journal of Democracy, vol. 21, no.  4, p.  131-138. 
66  The later question was with regards  to  "a parliamentary system in which nationalist,  left wing, 
right wing,  and Islamist parties compete in parliamentary elections." See Arab Barometer, 2006, 
op.  cit. 
67  See Mark Tessier,  2010, "Religion, Religiosity and  the Place of Islam in Political Life: Insights 
from the Arab Barometer Surveys," Middle East Law and Governance, vol. 2, p.  221-252. In this 
statement, we consider "democratie" to  be defined by those polled, in the ways they choose, and 
not according to any standardized definition. 25 
non-secular  groups,  whether  in  civic  engagement,  political  knowledge,  or  views 
towards womens rights
68
. 
In  Sudan,  support ' for  democracy  is  considerable,  with  a  large  majority 
(reported at 74% and 75% in different surveys) agreeing or strongly agreeing that "a 
democratie system may have its problems,  but it's better than other systems." This 
measure of support seems to  be similar or even higher than in  other North African 
countries
69
.  There is however a sizable minority that believes that "democracy is  a 
system that contradicts the teachings of Islam"
70
. Regarding evaluations of a "system 
governed by Islamic law without elections or political parties," or a "system in which 
nationalist,  left  wing,  right  wing,  and  Islamist  parties  compete  in  parliamentary 
elections,"  48.3%  find  the  former  appropriate  or  very  appropriate,  compared  to 
60.2% for the later,  electoral system
71
.  On this last indicator and on  a few others, it 
seems that rejection of secularism is slightly stronger in Sudan than in most MENA 
countries,  as  indicated by several  questions  included  in Table  2.  For instance,  in 
Sudan 66% indicate that they would not accept the attainment of power by a political 
party that "receives the necessary votes but believes in the separation of religion and 
state," which is significantly higher than the MENA average of 41%
72
• 
68  This point is  made in Tessier, 2010, loc.  cit.  p.  251. Other publications currently available do  not 
seem to  contradict this finding. 
69  The numbers above are from  the second round of the Arab Barometer and the  first round of the 
Arab Opinion Index, respectively. See van den Bosch, 2012,  loc. cit.,  p.  44, and Arab Centre for 
Research and Policy  Studies,  2012,  loc.  cit.,  p.  39.  For comparisons between  Sudan and  other 
countries, see Table 2. 
70  van den  Bosch,  2012,  op.  cit.,  p. 56.  On  this  question,  20.3% agreed  and  an  additional  12.0% 
strongly agreed. On this question there is no  "don't know" category indicated in the results. Data 
regarding other countries that would relevant for comparison is currently available only in Arabie, 
except for Iraq, where 25.8% either strongly agree or agree. See Michelle Hoffman, 2012, "Arab 
Barometer II: Iraq Country Report," Cairo: Arab Barometer, p. 49. 
71  van den Bosch, 2012, loc. cit., p. 46. 
72  Conversely,  and  taking  into  account the  percentages  in  the  don't know or declined  to  answer 
category (5% in Sudan, 14% in the region), the percentages saying they would accept such a party 
were  29%  in  Sudan  and 45%  on  average in  the MENA countries surveyed,  as  summarized in - - --- - --------
Table 2.2 
Attitudes towards democracy and 
the role of Islam in North Africa 
(percentages who agree or strongly agree) 
26 
Su dan  Egypt  Algeria 
1 T~ni  Morocco 
1 
s1a 
Survey:  AB2  IAOI  AOI  AB1 
1 
AOI  l AOI  AB1  AOI 
2010  2011  2011  2006  2011  2011  2006  2011 
Democracy may have its problems but is  74%  75%  56%  69%  56%  72%  85%  68% 
better than any other form of government. 
Democracy contradicts the teachings of  32%  - - 24%  - - 17%  -
Islam. 
1  1 
Would accept the attainment of power by a  - 29% 
1
56%  1 - 38% 
162% 1 - 42% 
political party that receives the necessary 
tmmber of votes but believes in the 
1  separation of religion and state (percentage 
who would accept) 
Religious practice is a private matter and  46%  31%  55%  29%  44%  63%  47%  35% 
should be separated from socio-political 
life. 
1 
1 
It is in the country's best interest to  - 25%  52%  - 40%  52% ,- 30% 
separate religion from politics. 
1  1  1  1 
Sources: Data presented are from the first and second rounds of the Arab Barometer surveys 
(AB1 and AB2) as well as from the recently released Arab Opinion Index (AO). For the AB1, see 
Arab Barometer, 2006, loc. cit.; for the AOI, the Arab Centre for Research and Policy, 2012, /oc. 
cit.; for the AB2, see van den Bosch, 2012, loc. cit. 
In  addition  to  gauging  support  for  democracy  and  secularism,  the  same 
surveys  also  evaluate  trust  for  or  satisfaction  with  institutions  such  as  the 
government and the judiciary. In what was Northern Sudan in 2010 (the territory of 
today's Sudan), 56% reported trusting the government to  a great or medium extent, 
with 18% reporting trust to  a limited extent and 23% reporting absolutely no  trust. 
Very  similar proportions  were  found  for  the  question  of  trust  for  public security 
forces. On the extent of satisfaction with the government on a scale of 1 to 10, results 
indicate levels of satisfaction similar to  other countries in the region,  with 28% of 
Table 3. See Arab Centre for Research and Policy,  2012, /oc.  cit. p. 43. 27 
respondents in Su  dan reporting high rates  of satisfaction, with scores of 7-10,  18% 
giving scores in the 4-6 range,  and another 32.0% giving scores of 1-3
73
.  This and 
two other cross-country comparisons of trust and satisfaction are shawn in Table 3. 
Table 2.3 
Comparative measures of trust in and satisfaction 
with governments and institutions in North Africa 
Su dan  Egypt  Algeria 
AB2  AOI  AOI  AB1  AOI 
2010  2011  2011  2006  2011 
How  satisfied  y ou  are  with  the  28%  - - 13%  -
performance  of  the  current  government 
of  your  country:  those  reporting  high 
1  rates of 7-10. 
Trust  in  y  our  country's  government:  - 56%  79%  - 48% 
percent reporting  a  "great deal  of trust" 
or "sorne trust." 
Trust  in  "public  security  (the  police)":  59%  - - 49%  -
percentage  reporting  to  a  "great"  or 
"medium" extent 
1 
Tu ni  Mo rocco 
si a 
AOI  AB1  AOI 
2011  2006  2011 
- 25%  -
47%  - 18% 
- 55%  -
Sources: For the AOI, see Arab Barometer, 2006, loc. cit.; Arab Centre for Research and Policy 
Studies, 2012, loc. cit.; for AB2, see van den Bosch, 2012, loc. cit.; 
In their perceptions of the fairness of the last "parliamentary elections," held 
in 2010, 43.8% of Sudanese citizens reported believing they were either completely 
free or fair,  or had only minor breaches, 11% reported that they were free or fair with 
sorne major breaches, and 29.2% reported that they were not free or fair
74
. Also on a 
question  of  freedoms,  around  half  of  respondents  in  Sudan  believe  that  the 
enforcement of anti-terror laws in Arab countries contributes to  a great or medium 
extent to  "violating the  public freedoms  of citizens," and  to  "limiting the  peaceful 
activities of the opposition," though a similar proportion believes that enforcing this 
73  van den Bosch, 2012, loc. cit., p.  51. 
74  van den Bosch, 2012, loc.  cit., p.  58. 28 
law  contributes  to  "combating  terrorism"
75
.  In  Sudan,  favouritism  in  the  state's 
application of laws is  perceived to be a problem by sorne, with only 21% indicating 
that the application is "equal to a great extent," 55% indicating that the state "applies 
the law among people but favours sorne groups," and 17% saying that the application 
is not at all equaF
6 
. 
. 2.2 Attitudes towards Western foreign policies and the International Criminal 
Court 
Available  multi-country  data  from  sub-Saharan  Africa,  mainly  from 
international polis,  shows relatively favourable attitudes towards the  EU,  the  USA, 
and even towards American foreign policy in the four sub-Saharan African countries 
for which this  data is  available
77
•  Near the end of the Bush era,  sub-Saharan Africa 
was  the  only  world  region  where  there  were  more  positive  than  negative  views 
towards the influence of the USA in the world
78
.  More recent studies show a similar 
75  The question was as  foliows:  "An anti-terrorism law was issued in  sorne Arab  countries, and  1 
would like to  know your opinion of this law. To what extent do  you think that enforcing this law 
contributes to ...  " Tn  Sudan, 52.2% responded that it contributes to "violating the public freedoms 
of citizens"  to  a  great  or  medium  extent,  compared  to  56.3%  finding  that  it  contributes  to 
"combating terrorism" to a great or medium extent. See ibid, p. 59 
76  See Arab Centre for Research and Policy, 2012, loc. cit., p. 59. There are also contrasting attitudes 
and experiences  re garding  discrimination, with 36.1% indicating  that  they  are  either not at  ali 
"being treated equaliy to other citizens" or are being treated as such only to a limited extent. (This 
later question is not specifie to  how people are treated by the government.) See van den Bosch, 
2012, loc.  cit., p.  43. 
77  For data on favourable attitudes towards US  foreign policy, see for example Bruce Stokes, 2010, 
"Summary  of Findings  from  Pew Global Attitudes  Project 2010  Survey  of  22  Nations,"  Pew 
Research  Centre  [online],  available  at  http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/ 
transatlanticProgramme/pdf/pewGlobal.pdf  (accessed  August  3rd,  2012).  For  a  summary  of 
recently polling results regarding the five sub-Saharan African countries covered by international 
polis  (Ghana,  Kenya,  Nigeria,  Uganda  and  South  Africa),  including  the  BBC  Worldwide 
Service/Globescan polis, the Gallup International Association polis, and the Pew Global Attitudes 
Polis,  see Council  on Foreign  Relations,  2012,  Public Opinion  on  Global  Issues,  Washington: 
Council on Foreign Relations. 
78  See BBC Worldwide Service 1 GlobeScan 2008, "Israel and Iran Share Most Negative Ratings in 
Global  Poil."  Available  at  http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbccntryview/ 
backgrounder.html (accessed August 3rd, 2012). ------- - ------ -
29 
finding  for  the  region
79
.  Confidence  in  NATO  similarly  illustrates  fairly  strong 
support  for  Western  foreign  policy in  sub-Saharan African  countries,  but weaker 
support in North African countries (see Table 4)
80
• Opinions regarding the ICC seem 
Table 4: 
Confidence in NATO in various African Countries 
Country/region 
Algeria  Morocco  South Africa  Uganda  Zimbabwe 
A great deal  1.6%  5.5%  22.0%  19.3%  9.5% 
Quite a lot  4.6%  5.5%  37.7%  34.0%  28.1% 
Not very  25.0%  18.4%  24.3%  25.2%  36.2% 
mu ch 
None at all  68.8%  70.6%  15.9%  21.5%  26.3% 
No. of  1023  363  2245 
1 
450  280 
respondents 
1 
Source: See World Values Survey Databank, 2000, 2001, and 2002, loc. cit. 
to  be similarly differentiated between sub-Saharan and North Africa, with approval 
for  the  ICC indictment of Sudanese President al-Bashir at  77% and 71% in Kenya 
and Nigeria respectively,  as  compared to  47% in Egypt (as well as  51% in Turkey, 
and only 25% in the Palestinian Territories)
81
. 
79  See BBC Worldwide Service 1 GlobeScan 2011,  "Positive Views of Brazil on  the Rise in  2011 
BBC Country Rating Poll." Available at http://www.globescan.com/images/images/pressreleases/ 
bbc2011_countries/bbc2011_countries_global_rls.pdf (accessed August 3'ct,  2012). 
80  It  should  be  noted  however  that  this  data  was  gathered  among  disporportionately  urban 
populations in sorne  countries, as  indicated by Michael Bratton, Norris Mattes and E.  Gyimah-
Boadi, 2005, Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, p.  51. 
81  In  each of these  countries,  face-ta-face  surveys  were  conducted  with  at  least 500  individuals 
between April and June 2009, in most countries  using a national sample except in  Egypt where 
the sample was urban and in Nigeria where the sample was national, but disproportionately urban. 
See WorldPublicüpinion.org 1 Chicago Council  on  Global Affairs,  2009,  "Muslim and African 
Nations on Bashir Indictrnent and Darfur." Available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/ 
pdf/jul09/WPO_Darfur_Jul09_quaire.pdf (accessed August 2"ct, 2012). 30 
Citizens  in  North African  countries  typically hold  negative  views  towards 
Arnerican  foreign  policy
82
.  Research  in Algeria  and  Jordan  has  asked  specifically 
about American foreign po licy and support for terrorist acts against Arnerican targets, 
and has  shawn that approval of such acts is  disproportionately likely  among those 
"with  negative  judgements  about  their  own  governments  and  about  US  foreign 
policy," but is unrelated to other factors including judgements about Western culture, 
religious  orientations,  or  economie  conditions  in  the  country
83
.  The  correlation 
between religiosity and views re garding the USAis found in sorne, but not all studies 
in  the  MENA region
84
.  Levels  of anti-Arnericanism  also  seems  to  be  positively 
associated with the intensity of secular/religious  political party  competition, which 
seems to lead elites to promote such sentiments
85
. Age has also been found to have a 
significant  impact  on  anti-Arnerican  views,  with  younger  generations  in  sorne 
countries being more likely to have a positive outlook regarding the USA
86
. 
A study indicates that public opinion in the MENA region is more favourably 
inclined  towards  sorne  Western  countries  than  others.  While  only  25%  and  33% 
report somewhat or very  favourable  attitudes  towards  the  USA and  the  UK,  49%, 
49%,  and  61%  reporting  such  attitudes  towards  Canada,  Germany,  and  France, 
respectively
87
•  The United Nations Security Council also enjoys sorne legitimacy in 
82  Shibley Telhami, 2007, "America in Arab Eyes," Survival, vol. 49,  no. 1, p.  115-117. 
83  Mark Tessier and Michael Rabbins, 2007, "What Leads Sorne Ordinary Arab Men and Women to 
Approve of Terrorist Acts against the United States?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.  51, no. 
2, p. 305. 
84  See  Mark Tessier, 2003,  "Arab and  Muslim Political  Attitudes: Stereotypes  and Evidence  from 
Survey Research," International Studies Perspectives, vol. 4, p. 177-179, and Blaydes and Linzer, 
2009, loc. cit. 
85  Blaydes and Linzer, 2009,  loc.  cit. 
86  See Tessier, 2003, loc. cit., p. 180. 
87  The question was as  follows: "I will read  you a list of countries.  Please tell me  if your overall 
impression of each is  either very favourable,  somewhat  favourable, somewhat un-favourable or 
very unfavourable, or if you are  not familiar enough to  form a judgement." See Peter Furia and 
Russell  Lucas,  2006,  "Determinants of Arab Public Opinion on  Foreign Relations," International 31 
the  MENA  region,  as  indicated  by  widespread  support  for  UN-led  military 
intervention to "prevent severe human rights violations such as genocide" or "to stop 
a country from supporting terrorist groups"
88
. 
In  Sudan,  there  seems  to  be  considerable  anti-American  sentiment,  as 
indicated by support for  the  statement that "The United  States'  interference in the 
region justifies armed operations against the United States elsewhere," with which 
53.5% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed, especially among those who 
indicate that  they always  pray daily
89
.  In  the  Arab  Opinion Index survey,  25%  of 
Sudanese  respondents  believe  that  the  USA is  the  country  "most  threatening  to 
[their] personal security," and 27% believe that the USA threatens "[their] country's 
security."  Only Israel was  perceived as  more threatening,  with values  of  37% and 
32%, respectively
90
. 
2.3 The political engagement of diasporas and of the Sudanese diaspora 
While there is very little data that looks at the political attitudes or opinions in 
diasporas
9
\  there  is  a  small  body  of  academie  literature  concerning  their 
Studies  Quarterly,  vol.  50,  no. 3  p.  586-87,  594.  The margins  of error reported  for  the  Zogby 
country surveys analyzed here ranges  from  four to  six per cent. The surveys were carried out in 
. seven Ar  ab co un tries including in two in North Africa (Egypt and Mo rocco). 
88  In no  country surveyed did Jess  than  61% believe that the UN should have the right to  authorize 
the  use  of  military  force  in  the  case  of genocide  (including Egypt 83%,  Turkey  64%,  and  in 
Palestinian Territories 78%). "To stop a country from  supporting terrorist groups," no  Jess  than 
60% in  any  country agreed.  See WorldPublicOpinion.org 1 Chicago Council on  Global  Affairs, 
2006-2008, quoted in Council on Foreign Relations, 2012, /oc.  cit., p. 22-23. 
89  Among  those  who  indicate  that  they  always  pray  daily,  56%  agree  with  the  statement,  as 
compared to  32.8% agreement among those  who  indicate  that  they  do  not  always  pray daily. 
Overall, 33.4% either disagree or strongly disagree with this statement, and the other 13.1% either 
responded that they don't know or declined to answer. See van den Bosch, 2012, op.  cit. p.  60. 
90  See Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, 2012, loc. cit. 
91  The definition of diaspora used in this document is as  follows: "groups of migrants, refugees and 
their descendants among whom there is  an  identity which refers  to  a homeland elsewhere."  See 
Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2006, "Diasporas and Conflict Resolution -Part  of the Problem or Part 32 
transnational politics. These studies are in part based on the realization that "sorne 
migrants  rnaintain  strong,  enduring  ties  to  their  hornelands  even  as  they  are 
incorporated  into  countries  of  resettlernent"
92
.  Sen  ding  mo ney  back  to  the  horne 
country (including to  re bel groups) is the best docurnented political role of diasporas 
in  countries in conflict.  Mernbers  of diasporas  often also  have  significant roles  in 
peace  processes
93
. ·  In  less  institutionalized  forrns,  sorne  politically  significant 
processes  of  reconciliation  can  also  take  place  arnong  rnernbers  of  the  diaspora, 
outside  the  country  of  origin
94
.  Diasporas  also  often  have  other  roles  such  as 
cornpiling and diffusing inforrnation
95
,  supporting political parties or other actors in 
the country of origin, or lobbying host governrnents
96
. 
The Sudanese diaspora is quite active in the politics of their horne country. As 
in other diasporas made up  prirnarily of refugees,  there is  strong opposition to  the 
of the Solution?" Copenhague, Danish Institute for International Studies, p. 1. Available online at 
http://www.düs.dk/graphics/Publications/Briefs2006/%F8stergaard-
nielsen_diaspora_conflict_resolution.pdf (accessed August 18'h, 2011). 
92  Peggy  Levitt,  Josh  DeWind  and  Steven  Vertovec,  2003,  "International  Perspectives  on 
Transnational Migration: An Introduction," International Migration Review, vol. 37, no 3, p. 565. 
93  See for example Patricia Ellis and Zafar Khan, "The Kashmiri diaspora: Influences in Kashmir," 
in  Nadje  Al-Ali  and  Khalid  Koser  (eds.),  New  Approaches  to  Migration?:  Transnational 
communities  and  the  transformation  of home,  London,  Routledge,  2002,  p.  169-187,  and  W. 
Zunzer,  "Diaspora Communities and  Civil Conflict Transformation," Berghof Occasional Paper 
no. 26, Berlin, Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004. 
94  See for example C. Orjuela, 2008, "Distant Warriors, Distant Peace Workers? Multiple Diaspora 
Roles in  Sri Lanka's Violent Conflict",  Global  Networks,  vol. 8,  no  4,  p.  436-452.  However, in 
sorne  cases,  forms  of nationalism common in  certain  diasporas  can  detract from  reconciliation 
attempts and even  exacerbate conflicts.  See for example Jolie Demmers, 2007, "New Wars  and 
Diasporas: Suggestions for  Research and  Policy," Journal of Peace,  Conflict and Development, 
vol. 11, p. 1-26. 
95  Fiona Adamson,  2002,  "Mobilizing  for  the  transformation  of  home:  politicized  identities  and 
transnational  practices,"  in  Nadje  Al-Ali  and  Khalid  Koser  (eds.),  New  Approaches  to 
Migration?:  Transnational Communities and the Transformation of  Home,  London, Routledge, p. 
155-168. 
96  Karpathakis, Anna, 1999, "Home Society Politics and Immigrant Political Incorporation: The case 
of Greek immigrants in New York City," International Migration Review, vol. 33, no.  1, p.  55-78. 33 
government  of  the  country  of  origin
97
.  Political  parties,  rebel  groups,  and  civil 
society  organizations  are  known  to  draw  on  the  diaspora  for  considerable 
participation,  leadership,  and  surely  funds  as  well.  Indeed  much  of  the  earlier 
leadership of such groups  and parties fled  Sudan in response  to  brutal  repression, 
including the  widespread use of arbitrary arrests,  torture,  extra-judicial executions, 
and disappearances since the 1989 coup that brought the current regime to power
98
. 
From  two  case  studies  and  from  anecdotal  evidence,  we  know  that  the 
Sudanese  diaspora  has  been  engaged  in  civil  society  activities  in  host  countries 
including Canada
99
. This includes human rights work, advocacy aimed at influencing 
the Canadian government's role in Sudan, and pressure on a Canadian oil company 
that was operating in Sudan. The sharing of information about political issues is very 
popular, particularly through online discussion forums and emaillists. 
One 2009 study is  indicative of sorne political opinions in the Sudanese and 
South Sudanese diasporas in Canada.  Few significant differences in  attitudes  were 
found  between Northerners  and  Southerners. A strong majority  of  those  surveyed 
(72%) agreed that "the removal of President al-Bashir is essential to achieving peace 
in Sudan," compared to  16% disagreeing. A majority (60%) agreed that the war in 
Darfur should be labelled "genocide." Regarding the roles and potential roles of the 
Canadian government in Sudan, many agreed with Canada sending peacekeepers to 
Darfur;  and  91%  agreed  with  the  notion  that  Canada  "has  a  responsibility  to 
intervene when civilians are threatened by violence in Sudan." However, 38% agreed 
with the statement that "Canada should not interfere in Sudan's internai conflicts," 
97  See  Jolie  Demmers,  2002,  "Diaspora and  Conflict:  Locality,  Long-Distance  Nationalism,  and 
Delocalization of Conflict Dynamics," The Public, vol. 89, no.  1, p. 85-96. 
98  The participation of the diaspora in political activities in  Sudan has rarely been documented, but 
has been mentioned in passing by a number of authors and in  other anecdotal evidence.  See for 
example Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf, 2002,  Wanderings: Sudanese Migrants and Exiles in  North 
America, lthaca, Cornell University Press, p. 156-163. 
99  Ibid, p. 156-163. 34 
while  54%  expressed  disagreement.  Issues  of  democracy  were  only  briefly 
addressed, such as  the overwhelming support found for the notion that "Sudan must 
achieve a true separation of religion and politics," with which 85% agreed and only 
12% disagreed
100
• 
2.4 Political divides in North Africa and surrounding regions 
Many studies examining the sources  of political opinions and  behaviour in 
Africa are focused on ethnicity, often highlighting the high levels of ethno-political 
fragmentation
101
.  This  fragmentation  is  related,  among  other  things,  to  the 
remarkable  ethna-cultural diversity  of most African countries, where cross-cutting 
markers of identity mean that a given individual or group  can identify  themselves 
with a number of identities. The divisions that take on political relevance in relation 
to  these identities are  often explained by authors with reference to  the evolution of 
the  political  context,  and  especially  the  ethnie  favouritism  of  colonial  powers 
102
• 
Ethnie  political divides  are  generally  considered to  be  the  dominant ones  in  most 
African countries
103
•  For example, Pippa Norris and Robert Mattes have found  that 
"even with social and attitudinal controls, ethnicity is a significant predictor of party 
support  in  most,  although  not  all"  of  the  twelve  sub-Saharan  African  countries 
100 This  study  was  based  on  two  survey  tools,  with  a  combination  of purposive  and  snow-ball 
sampling.  One  was  an  anonymous,  written  questionnaire,  priinarily  quantitative  in  nature,  to 
which 77 responded. These 77 respondents were solicited for additional responses, resulting in in-
depth interviews with  15 to 20 of them. See Mosaic Institute, 2009, "Profile of a Community: A 
'smart  map'  of the  Sudanese  diaspora  in  Canada,"  Toronto,  Mosaic  Institute,  p.  54. Available 
online at http://www.mosaicinstitute.ca/Publications.html (accessed August 16th, 2011). 
101 Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003, loc. cit., p.  80-83. 
102 See for  example Mozaffar,  Scarritt and Galaich, 2003,  loc.  cit.  and Mahmood Mamdani,  2009, 
Saviours and Survivors: Dafur, poli tics and the War on Terror,  New York, Verso Books. 
103 Kevin Deegan-Krause, 2006,  "New Dimensions of Political  Cleavage," in  R.  Dalton and H.-D. 
Klingemann  (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Politica/  Science, Oxford,  Oxford  University Press, p. 
15-16,  Scarritt  and Mozaffar,  1999,  loc. cit., and Nicholas  Cheeseman and  Robert Ford,  2007, 
"Ethnicity as a Political Cleavage," Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 83, Cape Town. 35 
included in their study
104
. However it should be noted that divides described as ethnie 
or tribal by sorne are often in large part religious, linguistic, geographie, or racial, 
due  to  overlapping  characteristics
105
•  For  this  and  other  reasons,  the  impact  of 
ethnicity bas  been the  subject of much debate. As  Daniel Young  bas  emphasized, 
based on a multi-country analysis, the notion that "African voters simply vote for co-
ethnies [  ...  ] is faulty"
106
• There are sorne countries where ethnie cleavages are not the 
dominant  ones.  In  Mali,  for  example,  ethnicity  bas  little  political  salience
107
.  In 
Ghana,  survey  data  reveals  partisan  alignments  that  are  urban-rural,  or  based  on 
education, occupation, or incarne level
108
• 
As  in  other  regions,  the  institutional  structures  in  African  countries  are 
considered to  play a major role in the formation of political divisions.  For example, 
the  legacy  of authoritarian regimes  appears  to  have  contributed  to  the  reliance  of 
parties on ethno-political mobilization and the weakness of inter-ethnie coalitions in 
sorne African countries
109
.  The functioning of highly clientelistic patronage systems 
bas  also  been linked to  the  importance  of ethno-political  cleavages. Van  de  Waal 
explains  that in such systems,  the  development  of a  localized  support base  for  a 
political  party  - often  along  ethnie,  regional  or  linguistic  lines  - is  helpful  for 
104 Pippa  Norris  and  Robert Mattes,  2003,  "Does  ethnicity  determine  support  for  the  governing 
party?," Afrobarometer Working Paper no.  26, Cape Town, p. iv. 
105 Daniel  Posner,  2001, "Regime Change and Ethnie Cleavages in Africa," Paper prepared for the 
Workshop  on  Democracy in Africa  in  Comparative Perspective,  Stanford  University,  27  April 
2001,  available  online  at http://democracy.stanford.edu/Seminar/Posner.htm  (accessed June  27'h, 
2011). 
106 Daniel Young,  2009,  "Support Y  ou  Can Count On?  Ethnicity,  Partisanship,  and  Retrospective 
Voting in Africa," Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 115, Cape Town, p. 3. 
107 Thad  Dunning  and  Lauren  Harrison,  2009,  "Cross-Cutting  Cleavages  and  Ethnie  Voting:  An 
Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali," Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 107,  Cape Town. 
108 Staffan Lindberg  and  Minion  Morrison, 2005,  "Exploring voter alignments in Africa:  core and 
swing voters in Ghana," Journal of  Modern African Studies, vol. 43, no. 4, p. 565-586. 
109 Shaheen  Mozaffar  and  James  Scarritt,  2005,  "The  puzzle  of African  party  systems,"  Party 
Politics, vol.  11, no. 4, p. 399-421. 36 
accessing patronage networks
110
. 
Divides relating to religion and secularism are also important to consider in 
countries like Sudan which have powerful Islamist movements and parties. In most 
North African and Middle Eastern countries, a secular-religious cleavage is generally 
considered to be among the most important ones, and can be broadly characterized as 
a  divide between Islamist movements and  political parties and those  which see a 
more  limited  or  no  role  for  Islam in  the  political  and  leg~l realms 
111
.  However, 
distinctions between Islamist and non-Islamist political forces are less clear in sorne 
countries,  where most major political parties  advocate  for  sorne  role  of Islam  in 
politics. In Turkey,  other factors  such as  urban/rural residence  and socioeconomic 
background  are  related  to  a  dominant  political  divide  between  a  relatively 
secularized, urban population and "a more traditional and Islamic 'periphery"'
112
•  In 
other countries,  the  most important religious  cleavage is  not between secular and 
Islamist political  forces,  but in relation  to  sectarian  divisions  among  Muslims 
113
. 
Divides between Sunni and Shi'a Islam are most obvious in this regard, but divisions 
with regards  to  Salafism or between Sufi orders ( tariqas)  are relevant in countries 
such as Sudan. 
2.5 Political divides in Sudan 
While national polling  data  on attitudes  or opinions  in  Sudan  has  become 
available only in 2012, and has not been analyzed in relation to political divisions in 
110 Nicolas  van  de  Walle,  2003,  "Presidentialism  and  Clientelism  in  Africa's  Emerging  Party 
Systems," The Journal of  Modern African Studies, vol. 41, no 2, p. 297-321. 
111 Blaydes and Linzer, 2009, loc. cit. 
112 Paul Kubicek, 2009,  "The  European Union  and  Political Cleavages in Turkey,"  Insight Turkey, 
vol.  11, no. 3, p.  110. 
113 Brian  Calfano  and  Emilie Sahliyeh, 2008, "Determining Democracy in  the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference," Social Science Quarter/y, vol. 89, no 3, p. 751-764. 37 
the  country,  there is  a considerable literature related to  the  dominant divisions that 
define  Sudanese  politics  and  especially  armed  conflicts.  This  literature  looks 
primarily at  three  divisions:  between Arabs  and non-Arabs,  between Islamists  and 
non-Islamists, and between marginalized and non-marginalized regions. 
2.5.1 Arab/non-Arab politics 
The importance of  the Arab/non-Arab  divide in  Sudan is  acknowledged by 
many scholars
114
.  The seminal work of Francis  Deng is  perhaps most often  quoted 
with regards to the nature and importance of the Arab/non-Arab (or "Arab/African") 
dynamic in Sudan. Deng explains how n,on-Arab groups have adopted attitudes that 
resist not only the idea of an Arab national identity,  but also of an ideology whereby 
they are considered by many to have a lower social status
115
. Thus one dimension of 
the Arab/non-Arab cleavage is based on adherence or resistance to  an Arab identity. 
Deng shows how there are remarkable (and illogical) contortions made by bath Arab 
and  non-Arab  individuals  to  either justify  their  "Arabness"  or to  negate  the  Arab 
elements of their culture and genealogy
116
. 
Deng and other authors have noted how the Sudanese political elite has been 
able to  benefit disproportionately from an Arab national identity,  mainly due  to  the 
varying  authenticity  of  daims  to  Arabness,  largely  based  on  skin-colour  or  on 
genealogies painting to the family of the Prophet
117
• Abdullahi Osman El-Tom makes 
a similar argument,  ouùining how in addition to  the  factors just mentioned, notions 
of modernity/backwardness  have  been used by  certain  tribes  in  central regions  to 
114 See for example Scarritt and Mozaffar, 1999, loc. cit.,  Daly 2007, op. cit., Johston, 2010, op. cit  .. 
115 Francis  Mading Deng,  1995,  War of Visions:  Conf/ict  of Identities  in the Sudan, Washington, 
Brookings Institution Press, p. 409-420. 
116 Ibid, p. 400-420. 
117 Ibid, p. 387-401. 38 
achieve and justify positions of power. El-Tom's argues that the combina  tian of skin 
colour  and  notions  of  modernity  are  much  more  powerful  than  the  credible 
geneological daims of sorne  darker-skinned Arab tribes in  peripheral regions
118
.  In 
such analyses, Sudanese "identification with Arabism is bath racial and cultural, with 
Islam as a central ingredient"
119
. The overlapping nature of these divisions potentially 
reinforces their impact on political opinions and behaviour.  Such divisions are also 
reinforced  by extreme  forms  of  racial  discrimination  including Arab  supremacist 
ideologies, though these may be somewhat marginal
120
. 
Political  dynamics  related  to  Arab/non-Arab  divisions  have  been  best 
documented in  relation to  the  North/South  conflict (now of limited  usefulness  for 
understanding  dynamics  within  Sudan)  and in Darfur,  where  such  divisions  have 
been undeniably prominent since at least the mid- to late-1980s. Conflicts over land 
rights  since  that time have often been between nomadic,  camel-herding (Rizayqat) 
Arab groups in the  North of Darfur and sorne non-Arab tribes,  mainly the  Zagawa 
and several sedentary tribes
121
.  Sorne have alternatively described these conflicts as 
being between sedentary and nomadic populations, or between those tribes that have 
rights to a dar, a particular territory, and those that do not
122
. Therefore in Darfur, the 
118 Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, 2006, "Darfur People: Too Black for the Arab-Islamic Project of Sudan 
-PattI." Irish Journal of  Anthropology, vol. 9, no. 1, p.  5-11. 
119 Deng,  1995,  op.  cit.,  p.  434.  The  original  quote,  written  long  before  the  separation  of  South 
Sudan, is that "Northern Sudanese identification with Arabism is both racial and culturaL.." In the 
current context, his analysis still rings true when applied to  the same group, who we would  now 
refer to sirnply as "Sudanese." 
120 See  especially  Atta  El-Battahani,  "Ideological  Expansionist  Movements  versus  Historical 
Indigenous Rights in the Darfur Region of Sudan: From Actual Homicide to Potential Genocide," 
in Sarah Hassan and Carina Ray (eds.) Darfur and the Crisis of Governance  in Sudan: A Critical 
Reader, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2010, p. 43-67. 
121 See for example de Flint and de Waal, 2008, op. cit., and Dally, 2007, op. cit. 
122 Mahrnood Mamdani has argued in  greater detail  than other au thors  that the conflicts in  Darfur 
should be  understood mainly as  being between tribes with  dors  and  those without. However in 
rnaking this argument, he also explores how ideologies regarding the nature of Arab and non-Arab 
groups have had a profound impact on the  evolution of these conflicts. See Mamdani, 2010,  op. 39 
Arab/non-Arab  cleavage  should  be  regarded  as  closely  related  to  the  struggle 
between  tribes  for  land  rights.  The  instrumentalization  of  these  conflicts  by  the 
Government of Sudan, through their efforts to  defeat rebel groups, has transformed 
and exacerbated these divisions. 
There  are  however reasons  to  doubt  the  dominance  of the  Arab/non-Arab 
cleavage.  First,  despite  the  dominance  of  Arab  tribes  in  all  post-independence 
governments in Sudan, sorne Arab tribes, particularly those in peripheral regions, had 
few economie or political privileges for many decades. In Darfur, for example, many 
Arab tribes were granted less land rights, less political representation, and less social 
status  than  sorne  of  the  settled,  primarily  non-Arab  populations,  from  at  least 
colonial times until the 1980s or 1990s
123
,  and have experienced particular precarity 
since the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s
124
. 
It should also be noted that in  Darfur, while sorne aspects of Arab/non-Arab 
divides can be traced back many decades, experts tend to emphasize the very limited 
political  significance  of  any  such  divides  before  the  1980s
125
.  Even  since  the 
formation  of explicitly Arab and  non-Arab  militarized groups  and alliances in  the 
late 1980s and the current regime's use of Arab proxy militias in Darfur after 2003 
cit.  It  should  be  noted  however  that  sorne  authors  have  been  very  critical  of  Mamdani's 
description  of inter-tribal politics in  Darfur.  See  for  example Johnston, Douglas.  "Commentary: 
Mamdani's 'Settlers', 'Natives', and the War on Terror." Afrcan Affairs, vol.  108, no. 433, p.  655-
660. 
123 Indeed the  ward Arab  is  sometimes used  to  "indicate a nomadic way of !ife and  an  associated 
inferior social status. (Conversely, nomads look dawn upon sedentary agriculturalists.)" Ahmed S. 
Al-Shahi, "Proverbs  and  Social  Values  in  a  Northern  Sudanese Village,"  in  lan  Cunnison  and 
Wendy James (eds.), Essays in Sudan Ethnography, London, Hurst, 1972, p. 92. Quoted in Deng, 
1995, op. cit., 409. 
124 Mamdani, 2010, op.  cit. 
125 See especially Sharif Harir, 1994, "Arab Belt" Versus "African Belt": Ethno-Political Conflict in 
Dar Fur and  the Regional Cultural Factors," in  Short-eut to  Decay:  The  Case  of Sudan,  Sharif 
Harir  and  Terje  Tvelt.  Uppsala:  Scandinavian  Institute  of African  Studies,  p.  143-184.  Erik 
Neilsen,  2008, "Ethnie Boundaries and conflict in Darfur," Ethnicities, vol.  8,  no.  4,  p.  427-462. 
Flint and de Waal, 2008, op. cit. 40 
(  especially until 2006), there are still sorne significant political events in Darfur that 
do  not  align  with  this  cleavage.  For example,  sorne  Arab  groups  have  remained 
neutral and sorne of those that previously fought on the side of the government have 
since allied themselves with rebel groups
126
• In sorne  other cases, Arab groups have 
fought  with  the  SPLA/M  in  other  regions.  Despite  these  mitigating  factors,  the 
Arab/non-Arab division undoubtedly constitutes an  important cleavage in  Sudanese 
politics, though it is not clear from available analysis whether it is the dominant one. 
2.5.2 Religious divisions: differences of sect and degree of Islamism 
Religious  sects  and  Islamist/secular  politics  are  also  part  of  any  thorough 
discussion of cleavages in  Sudan.  Before the  1980s,  Sudanese politics was largely 
dominated by the NUP and DUP, and their associated Ansar and Khatmiyya religious 
sects,  ruled  by  the  Mahdi  and  Mirghani  f~milies,  respectively
127
•  At  least  until 
recently, these parties were considered to  have large followings, particularly in rural 
areas,  where  "allegiance  to  an  order  tend[ed]  to  go  hand-in-hand  with  tribal 
identity"
128
.  This  sectarian  division  has  a  very  powerful  influence  over  Sudanese 
post-independence  politics,  but seems  to  have  greatly  diminished  since  the  1989 
coup that brought al-Bashir's Islamist regime to power. 
Turning to  Islamist politics in Sudan, it should be noted that major debates 
over secularism and the role of Islam in politics date back to  1950s and 1960s efforts 
to  promote  Islam  (and Arabie)  all  over  Sudan,  which  fed  into  Southern  fears  of 
126 See Flint and de Waal,  2008, op cit., especially 257-262. Furthermore, the largest Arab groups in 
Darfur have generally refrained from  engaging with the conflict between government and  rebel 
forces since 2003. 
127 The  rivalry  between  the  Ansar  and  Khatamiya  sects  dates  back  to  the  late  1990s.  Before 
independence, there were rival political parties allied with these two religious sects, now the NUP 
and the DUP. See Collins, 2008, op. cit., p. 50-51, 89. 
128 John Morton, 1989, "Ethnicity and Politics in Red Sea Province, Sudan," African Affairs, vol. 88, 
no. 350, p.  63. 41 
Northern  domination.  The  growing  influence  of  Islamist  political  forces,  the 
imposition of Sharia laws,  and the  subsequent return to  North-South war,  were all 
factors that polarized existing tensions and brought issues of secularism and Islamist 
politics to  the forefront of national debates.  Since 1999, the Islamist movement has 
been  divided  between the  ruling  NCP  and  the  PCP  headed  by Hassan  al-Tura  bi. 
Since  then,  even supporters  of the  ruling  NCP  (not only those  suspected  of  PCP 
links) have be  en sidelined by the current regime or have abandoned party structures 
as  power  has  become  increasingly  centralized  in  a  small  number  of  security 
hardliners and members of certain families/tribes
129
. 
In addition to Islamist political parties such as the NCP and the PCP, and the 
rebel JEM in Darfur, the DUP and the NUP are also fairly Islamic-oriented. The later 
two  parties  are  not generally  referred  to  as  Islamist in  the  Sudanese  context - a 
convention which I follow in this document - however each has published their own 
kinds  of  Islamist-influenced  manifestas,  statements,  and  electoral  material.  Their 
1986  electoral  slogans,  respectively  calling  for  an  "Islamic Republic"  and  for  an 
"Islamic Renaissance," are indicative of the extent to  which these parties support a 
considerable role  for  Islam in politics and public life
130
.  The Sudanese case is  thus 
different from  most countries  in North Africa and  the  Middle-East where  Islamist 
political  parties have been opposed mainly by secular nationalist ones
131
.  Political 
attitude data also makes it clear that large proportions of the public in Sudan favour 
129 International Crisis Group 2011,  loc.  cit.  With multiple divisions and tumultuous changes in  the 
Islamist movement,  tribal/family  networks  and  participation in  NCP  networks  seems to  be  the 
most important credentials to  benefit from the patronage of the regime in  most cases, whether at 
local, regional, or nationallevels. However, it should be noted that at sub-nationallevels, political 
corruption  and  patronage  can  be  distributed  with  limited  national  control  or  oversight,  by 
powerful regional power brokers. Even NCP organizations can be marginalized or even attacked 
by powerful regional actors. 
130 Kamal El-Din, "Islam and Islamism in  Darfur," in Alex de  Waal  (ed.),  War  in  Darfur: And the 
Search  for Peace, Harvard Global Justice Initiative, Cambridge, 2007, p. 92-112. 
131 Blaydes and Linzer, 2009, op. cit. 42 
Islam having a significant role in politics and public life. It seems misleading then to 
refer  to  a secular/religious  cleavage,  as  secularism  seems  to  find  limited  support. 
There is  however an extremely politically salient division regarding how much and 
in what ways Islam should influence politics, which could be described as a cleavage 
between Islamists and non-Islamists. 
2.5.3 Marginalized peripheries 
In  academie  works  on  Sudan,  the  marginalization  of peripheral  regions  is 
very frequently invoked, at least in passing, and is  often described as  dating back to 
the  colonial  period.  Ali  post-independence  governments  have  been  criticized  as 
having  done  little  to  address  development  imbalances  or  to  improve  the 
representation  of  peripheral  regions  among  the  political  elite
132
•  The  political 
marginalization  of  most  regions  of  Sudan  is  often  argued  with  reference  to  the 
widely-discussed Black Book, whose anonymous authors documented the dominance 
of  elites  from  two  states  accounting  for  only  4. 7%  of  (united)  Sudan's  2001 
population
133
•
134
.  Individuals from these two states, largely inhabited by the  Shaigiya, 
the  Jaaliyin and  the  Dangala tribes,  have  made  up  a  strong  if  not  overwhelming 
majority  of  ministers  in  almost  ali  post-independence  regimes  in  Sudan.  Other 
observers similarly claim that even lower level government jobs and  much  of the 
economy is  dominated to  a similar extent by the people of these Northern states, or 
132 See for exarnple Mansour Khalid, 2005, op. cit.,  or Johnston, 2011, op. cit. 
133 Namely  Northern  State  and  River  Nile.  The  population  figure  is  attributed  to  a  World  Bank 
publication, cited  in  Cobharn.  2006,  loc.  cit.,  p. 465. For  an example  of  a  text pre-dating  the 
Black-Book, but making a similar argument,  see Kasfir, 1990, loc.  cit. 
134 The Black Book:  lmbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan was distributed outside of masques in 
major cities, mainly in Khartoum, in 2000. lt was denounced on the front pages of government 
newspapers and quickly banned. lt seems to have become well known in Sudan. In  relation to the 
specifie daim above, the three tribes made up between 59% and 79% of ministers and presidents 
in all post-independence regimes except during the second democratie period (1986-1989), when 
the proportion was 47%. As cited in Cobham, 2005, loc. cit., p. 465. 43 
as  others more commonly put it,  members of these Riverain tribes
135
.  The exclusion 
of people from peripheral areas has been apparent for a long time, including in pre-
and post-independence debates over federalism. More recently,  it seems that sorne 
hoped that the Islamist movement would be more representative of different regions, 
but many from Darfur reportedly left the NCP disillusioned by the party's failure to 
give more influence to those from peripheral regions
136
. 
The  economie  marginalization  of  most  peripheral  areas  is  even  better 
documented than their political exclusion. The Black Book daims that the dominance 
of  individuals  from  Northern  states  is  also  reflected  in  skewed  government 
expenditures.  A  scholarly  analysis  of  the  Black  Book  similarly  indieates  that 
Khartoum and Northern and River Nile states (which include a fifth of the country's 
inhabitants) enjoy higher government subsidies, rnuch higher per capita development 
expenditure,  and  score  almost twice  as  high  as  the  West or  East  on sorne  human 
development indicators
137
.  Similarly, scholars studying Darfur have underlined how 
the widely discussed paucity of economie or social development efforts in the South 
was  mirrored  in  Darfur,  both during  the  colonial  er a  and  long  afterwards 
138
•  The 
economie marginalization of people from  certain regions  of Sudan  (and of certain 
groups within these regions) has been furthered by signifieant land expropriations in 
sorne areas, including on the territories of nomadic Beja people of Eastern Sudan
139
• 
135 The idea of Riverain  tribes,  Rive~ain Sudan  (as  a region)  and  similar usages  of  the  term  have 
become common in  political analyses of the  situation in  Sudan.  For the  dominance of Riverain 
tribes in government, among the civil service, and in the economy see International Crisis Group, 
2011, loc. cit., and Flint and de Waal, 2008, op.  cit., p.  16-17. 
136 See for example Flint and de Waal, 2008, op.  cit., p.  102-108. 
137 For example,  as  of 2002,  the  West (Darfur and  Kordofan) had a 38% rate  of literacy  and  44% 
gross primary enrolment, compared  to  72%  and  82% respectively,  in  Northern  and  River Nile 
states. See Cobham, 2006, loc.  cit., p. 475. 
138 See Daly, 2007, op.  cit., especially p.  224-225, 239-242. 
139 Johnston 2011, op. cit., 130-139. 44 
Analyses of marginalization are  coherent with the overall patterns of armed 
conflicts in Sudan, as all major marginalized regions of Sudan have been involved in 
conflicts with the GoS. Re bel movement manifestas and political declarations have . 
often made explicit reference to  the marginalization of peripheral regions
140
.  Recent 
political  events  point  to  the  continued  prominence  of  the  divide  between 
marginalized  and non-marginalized areas.  For instance,  a  well  known 2005  paper 
presented to the economie committee of the NCP by an ex-Minister of Finance and 
National Economy of the current regime argued for government economie efforts to 
be  concentrated almost  exclusively in  the  central  "Dongola-Sennar plus  Kordofan 
axis,"  an  area  which  excludes  large  parts  of today's  Sudan including  Qarfur and 
Eastern Sudan
141
.  Riverain dominance has  been maintained,  especially through the 
current regime's extensive use of tribal affiliation to  ensure its  hold on power.  For 
example,  the  National  Intelligence  and  Security  Service  (NISS)  has  become  a 
powerful  organ,  with  personnel  recruited  mainly  from  the  Riverain  tribes.  In 
addition,. the Jaaliyin top elite have reportedly created a military force from among 
members of their tribe, under the direct command of al-Bashir
142
.  Riverain tribes are 
also  known  to  dominate  various  economie  sectors  through  corruption  and 
nepotism
143
. 
2.6 Theoretical framework and hypothesis 
This  study  of  attitudes  towards  armed  conflicts,  the  roles  of  Western 
140 One partial exception is  the "Justice and Equality Movement (JEM): Proposai for Peace in Sudan 
in General and Darfur in Particular," published in Hassan and Ray, 2010,  op.  cit.  p. 378-380. This 
declaration  places  a  considerable  emphasis  on  the  distribution  of  political  power  and  public 
wealth, but does not refer to marginalization as such. 
141 Abdel  Rahim  Mohamed Hamdi,  "The Future  of  Investment During  the  Interim  Period:  What 
Investment and Where in the Country?" Khartoum, quoted in El-Din, 2007, loc.  cit., p. 103. 
142 International Crisis Group, 2011, loc. cit., p. 10, 14. 
143 Ibid, p. 18-19. 45 
countries,  and  democratization  in  Sudan  between  2005  and  mid-2011  is  in  part 
exploratory, and in part explanatory. The exploratory component documents attitudes 
in the Sudanese diaspora, a population whose political attitudes and roles have rarely 
been studied.  The  theoretical  framework  and  hypothesis  refer  to  the  explanatory 
component of the thesis, whereby the  concept of cleavages is  employed to  identify 
and better understand the linkages between a socio-demographic characteristic and 
political attitudes. 
The  concept  of  cleavages  is  used  to  identify  one  or  several  particularly 
dominant divisions  that  shape  political  attitudes,  behaviours,  and  institutions  in  a 
given population, often on the basis of a socio-demographic difference such as class 
or ethna-regional identity.  Lipset and Rokkan's classic study identified class-based, 
urban/rural,  religious/secular,  and  centre/periphery  cleavages.  According  to  these 
authors,  cleavages that first defined political arenas in Western European countries 
"froze", as  reflected in the stability of political institutions and electoral behaviours 
from the  1920s well into the 1960s
144
.  More recent studies have identified cleavages 
in  many  other  countries,  in  different  world  regions.  For  example,  Blaydes  and 
Lintzer argue  that  "in large  parts  of  the  Islamic world,  the  substance  of political 
debate  surrounds  a  secular-religious  issue  cleavage."  While  most  cleavages  have 
been identified in relation to socio-demographic variables similar to  those identified 
by Lipset and Rokkan, sorne argue that there are cleavages based on factors such as 
gender
145 or differences between materialist and post-materialist values
146
. 
144 Seymour  Lipset  and  Stein  Rokkan,  1967,  "Cleavage  Structures,  Party  Systems,  and  Voter 
Alignrnents,  An  Introduction,"  in  Party  Systems  and  Voter  Alignements:  Cross-National 
Perspectives, Seymore Lipset et Stein Rokkan (eds.), New York, The Free Press, p.  1-64. 
145 C.  Brooks,  P. Nieuwbeertaà,  and J.  Manza,  2006,  "Cleavage-Based Voting  Behavior in  Cross-
National Perspective:  Evidence from  Six Postwar Democracies,"  Social  Science  Research,  vol. 
35, p. 88-128. 
146 Ronald  Inglehart,  1990,  Culture  Shi ft  in  Advanced  Industrial ·Society,  Princeton,  Princeton 
University Press. 46 
Definitions of cleavages have been the  subject of much debate  in  political 
science.  Deegan-Krause  has  identified  the  most  common  elements  in  academie 
conceptualizations  of  cleavages:  socio-demographic/structural  differences  (most 
notably  differences  of  ethnie  origin,  urban/rural  residence,  class,  religion,  or 
language), differences of attitudes (based in more fundamental values or beliefs), and 
finally differences of political institutions, especially political parties.  A number of 
scholars who  sought to  further  specify the madel outlined by  Lipset and  Rokkan 
have argued that the notion of cleavage entails having all three elements
147
• However, 
many  others  refer  to  cleavages  when  describing  divisions  manifested  by  the 
alignment of only two elements
148
. 
Our analysis is focused on a division that brings together a structural factor 
and  attitudes
149
.  To  avoid  getting  entangled  in  definitional  debates,  cleavages  are 
defined in a general way in this thesis, as divisions that are politically significant and 
deeply  rooted  in  a  given  population
150
.  The  terms  "cleavages",  "divisions"  and 
"divides" are therefore used interchangeably. Specifically, the cleavage examined in 
this analysis brings together the following elements: region of origin (marginalized 
or non-marginalized region) and attitudes related to  conflicts,  Western intervention, 
and democracy.  Potential institutional elements of the  cleavage studied are  beyond 
the  scope  of  this  research,  in  part  because  institutions  in  Sudan  are  currently 
unstable,  given recent  changes  including continuing conflicts  in  certain  areas,  the 
severe  repression  of  political  activities,  and  the  fluid  nature  of political  alliances 
147 Stefano Bartolini and  Peter Mair are among the most prominent proponents of this point of view. 
See  Stefano Bartolini,  and Peter Mair,  1990,  Identity,  Competition, and Electoral Availability: 
The Stability of European Electorates, 1885-1985, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
148 Deegan-Krause, 2006, loc.  cit. 
149 This is a combination of elements that Deegan-Krause would refer to as  a "position di vide."  See 
ibid. 
150 This definition is similar to  the "general" definition of cleavages proposed by Oddbjorn Knutsen 
and Elinor Scarborough in their 199() chapter "Cleavage Politics," in Jan W. Van Deth and Elinor 
Scarborough (eds.) The Impact of  Values, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 495. 47 
between  rebel  groups  and  political  parties.  Formai  political  institutions  in  the 
Sudanese diaspora itself are tao lirnited to be included in a cleavage analysis. 
Lipset and Rokkan's seminal work on cleavages is prirnarily based on support 
for  political  parties  in  Europe  in  the  20th  century.  In  this  context,  the  national, 
regional, religious, and ethnie rnarkers of citizens have been relatively stable, despite 
sorne changes of borders due to wars. However in African contexts, authors tend to 
accentuate  changes  in  cleavages  over  tirne
151
.  For  sorne  authors  such  as  Daniel 
Posner, the socio-dernographic factors that anchor many cleavages undergo graduai 
changes, including identification with a region of origin, a tribe, or an  ethnicity
152
. 
For  exarnple,  Naorni  Chazan  rnakes  the  following  observation  in  the  Ghanaian 
context: 
Sometimes ethnie solidarity was expressed in cultural and linguistic terms. 
At other times ethnicity was presented in  regional or geographie terms. At 
still other points, ethnicity was manifested in local-communal - traditional, 
political, or kin - terms ... Ali possible ethnic-political presentations, either 
separately  or in  conjunction,  could  be  brought  to  bear  on  the  political 
situation depending on particular conditions
153
• 
Other  authors  sirnilarly  point  out  how  individuals  identify  thernselves  differently 
depending  on  whether  the  individual  or institution  that  they  are  interacting  with 
shares  one  or more  of their potential identity-rnarkers
154
.  Taking  an  exarnple  from 
Darfur, "cornrnunity leaders for whorn the terrn 'African' would have been alien even 
151 See  for example  Posner,  2001,  loc.  cit.,  and  2005,  Institutions  and  Ethnie  Politics  in  Africa, 
Cambridge,  Cambridge  University  Press,  2005,  p.  10-17,  and  Mozaffar,  Scarritt  and  Galaich 
2003, loc. cit. 
152 Posner, 2005, loc.  cit., p. 10-17. 
153 It should  be  noted  that  Naomi  Chazan's  analysis  quoted  above  does  not  use  the  concept  of 
cleavages;  however  it  is  nonetheless  suggestive  of  the  complexity  of  sorne  ethno-political 
cleavages, and of how the political use of identity markers changes over time. See Naomi Chazan, 
"Ethnicity and Politics in Ghana," Political Science Quarter/y, vol. 97, p.  461-85. This quote was 
used to make a similar point in Posner, 2001, loc. cit., p.  1. 
154 Posner, 2005, op. cit., p. 11. 48 
a  decade  aga,  now  readily  identify  themselves  as  such  when  dealing  with 
international interlocutors"
155
. Also, anthropologists have documented how sorne Fur 
farmers  in Darfur would "become Baggara" over time,  adopting Arabie and  other 
socio-cultural traits of this neighbouring tribé
56
.  Thus, through a complex series of 
different interactions and events, various socio-demographic factors  can emerge as 
very politically salient. 
We chose to focus on regional affiliation instead of ethnicity in part due to the 
relative fluidity of ethnicity and tribal affiliations in Sudan, as well because of works 
that question  the  centrality of ethnicity in  defining  political views in Africa.  This 
focus should not be understood as rejection of the impact of ethnicity or other factors 
such as  religion. Indeed, as  in many countries, regional, ethnie, tribal, linguistic and 
other markers of identity in Sudan overlap to sorne extent. Regional affiliation is also 
a less sensitive characteristic than ethnicity in the Sudanese context
157
. 
Regional  affiliation  is  closely  related  to  geographical  difference,  a 
contemporary  label  for  the  structural  element  behind  the  urban/rural  cleavage 
outlined by Lipset and Rokkan
158
.  We  further adapt it to  the abject of our study by 
differentiating between marginalized and non-marginalized regions. This designation 
also recalls the centre/periphery cleavage laid out by Lipset and Rokkan, narnely a 
cleavage  between  "the  central  nation-building  culture"  of  a  given  country  and 
"ethnically,  linguistically, or religiously distinct subject populations in the provinces 
155 de Waal, 2005, loc.  cit., p. 197. 
156 de Waal, 2005, loc.  cit., p. 194. 
15 7 The first respondents interviewed were asked wh  ether they would identify themselves in ethnie or 
tribal  terms; however severa!  declined  to  do  so  and  the  question was  dropped.  Ethnie or tribal 
affiliations, even the most general ones, therefore could not be verified without information from 
third parties that would violate the anonymity and go contrary to the wishes of sorne respondents. 
158 See Deegan-Krause, 2009, loc.  cit.. 49 
and the peripheries"
159
.  However, the notion of a cleavage between marginalized and 
non-marginalized  Sudanese  regions  is  different  in  an  important  way.  Regional 
marginalization  emphasizes  the  political  and  economie  exclusion  of  peripheral 
regions without necessarily making reference to  distinct ethnie, tribal, or linguistic 
characteristics. It  should therefore  not be  confused with the Arab/non-Arab  divide 
outlined in the literature review
160
. 
Finally,  because  the  Sudanese  diaspora  in  Canada  is  largely  composed  of. 
people  who  came  from  Sudan  relatively  recently,  expectations  derived  from  the 
literature about Sudanese politics and context are relevant. We  therefore hypothesize 
that distinct political attitudes in  the  Sudanese diaspora with  regards  to  current 
conflicts  in  Sudan,  Western  intervention,  and  democratization  are  related  to 
origins in a marginalized or non-marginalized region of Sudan. 
We  consider that marginalized regions in Sudan include Darfur (the states of 
Northern,  Southern,  and  Western  Darfur),  Western  and  Southern  Kordofan,  Blue 
Nile, and Eastern Sudan (Gedaref, Kassala,  and Red Sea states). Significant areas of 
other states, perhaps  especially Northern Kordofan,  could also be considered  to  be 
economically  and  politically  marginalized.  However,  specifying  parts  of  states  is 
complex  and  unnecessary  for  the  purposes  of  this  study.  Similarly,  around  the 
national  capital,  there  is  a  large  population  that  can  also  be  described  as 
economically and politically marginalized, but will not be considered a marginalized 
"region" in our analysis. 
159 See Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, loc.  cit., p.  14. 
160 This is  despite  the  fact  that in our sample,  the  distribution  of respondents  along the  Arab/non-
Arab  divide  is  likely  very  similar to  (though  not  the  sarne  as)  their distribution  according  to 
marginalized or non-marginalized region. --------~------ ----
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Semi-structured  interviews  were  conducted  with  fifteen  members  of  the 
Sudanese  diaspora.  This  chapter  begins  by  describing  the  Sudanese  diaspora  in 
Canada, then presents the  recruitment method and the  interviewees themselves. The 
questionnaire is  then presented,  along  with a  discussion  of  the  attitudes  that  were 
studied.  The  final  section explains biases related  to  my  identity or affiliations  that 
may have affected the results. 
3.1 The Sudanese diaspora and the sample 
In  Canada,  around  a  quarter  of  the  more  than  15,000
161  members  of  the 
Sudanese or South Sudanese diasporas live in Toronto, another quarter live elsewhere 
in South-Western Ontario and around a fifth live in Calgary. Around 700-900 or more 
members of these diasporas  are  estimated to  live in each  of Edmonton, Vancouver 
and  Winnipeg
162
.  Average levels  of educational  attainment are  considerably higher 
than most refugee populations in  Canada,  with a quarter of  this  population having 
completed  a  post-secondary  degree  or  diploma
163
.  Most  of  those  who  arrived  as 
161 For more detailed numbers and estimates, see the introduction. 
162 Statistics Canada, 2006,  loc.  cit.  It should be noted that in Edmonton it seems that the combined 
population of these diasporas is "dominated by Southerners" and  that "the majority"  of those in 
Calgary are from South Sudan. See Mosaic 2009, loc.  cit. p. 21. 
163 The for  Sudanese refugee educational attainment is  from  a 2006  Canadian Census data  product 
purchased by the  Mosaic Institute and  not publicly available.  See  Mosaic  2009,  loc.  cit.  p. 32. 51 
refugees  are  known  to  face  considerable  challenges.  Lack  of  sufficient  incarne 
(mainly due to limited employment options), housing difficulties, and discrimination 
are  commonly cited problems
164
.  For  sorne,  language  proficiency is  an  additional 
challenge. In  a 2004 study of recent,  Sudanese refugees in  South-Western Ontario, 
lack of English proficiency was mentioned as  a barrier to  gaining employment by 
27% of men and 65% of women
165
. 
Fifteen in-depth interviewees were conducted with members of the Sudanese 
diaspora.  Due  to  the  limited  size  of  the  diasporas  and  their  being  spread  over  a 
considerable  number  of  cities,  a  snow-balling  approach  was  used  to  identify 
respondents willing to be interviewed. The initial goal was to speak with a balanced 
number  of  Northerners  and  Southerners,  however  given  significant  challenges 
involved  with  recruitment,  this  could  not  be  achieved
166
.  This  thesis  focuses 
exclusively  on  the  attitudes  of  members  of  the  Sudanese  diaspora:  those  whose 
origins are within the current borders of Sudan. As per terminology that seems fairly 
widely  accepted  in  these  communities,  at  least  since  the  independence  of South 
Sudan,  I  use  the  term  "Sudanese"  as  a  category  that  is  exclusive  from  "South 
Sudanese."  Occasionally,  when  referring  to  periods  before  the  independence  of 
Among ail  refugees  in  Canada from  non-European  source  countries,  only  6.3%  of those  who 
arrived between 1980 and 2001 held a bachelors degree or higher by the time of data collection. 
See  de  Varetz,  Don,  Sergiy  Pivnenko  and  Morton  Beiser.  "The  Economie  Experiences  of 
Refugees in Canada." Discussion paper no. 1088. Bonn: Insitute of the Study of Labour, 31 p. 
164 Data  on  employment  profiles,  housing,  discrimination,  and  other  problems  can  be  found  in 
Citizenship  and  Immigration  Canada,  "The study  of Sudanese  settlement  in  Ontario  - Final 
report," CIC  Settlement Directorate, 2004. The employment profile whereby most new Sudanese 
and  South Sudanese refugees have been limited  to  poorly paying jobs  is  corroborated by other 
studies  such  as  Patrick  Kandi  Keyero,  "When  remittances  become  their  tears:  Canada's 
exclusionary immigration policy towards Africari immigrants robs  Sudanese  immigrants  of the 
very money they need for settlement," M.A.  Thesis, Toronto, Ryerson University, 2007.  See also 
Mosaic Institute, 2009, loc. cit. 
165 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2004, loc.  cit. p.  18. 
166 Only  five  interviews  with  members  of  the  South  Sudanese  diaspora  could  be  completed.  Ali 
references to the sample in this document refer on! y to the 15 members of the Sudanese diaspora. 52 
South Sudan in 2011,  I refer to  "Northern Sudanese"  or "Northerners" to  refer to 
those who identify their origins within the current borders of Sudan. 
I had sorne contacts in the Sudanese and to a lesser extent, Southern Sudanese 
diasporas prior to  beginning the thesis due to having been an employee, and later a 
volunteer,  of  the  Darfur/Sudan  Peace  Network  for  two  and  a  half  years  (2007-
2010)167. Interviews began more than a year later.  Five  interviewees were  already 
contacts  of mine.  The  ten  other  respondents  were  identified  through  these  initial 
contacts. 
Seven of the fifteen respondents lived mainly in non-marginalized regions of 
Sudan (Khartoum and parts  of the Nile Valley)  and did not profess  any  affiliation 
with any other region.  The  other  eight identified themselves with regions  that are 
widely considered to be marginalized. Three of these respondents grew up  in Darfur, 
one in western Kordofan,  and another simply identified with the  "Western" part of 
Sudan.  Two  respondents  identified  themselves  with  the  Nuba  Mountains.  One 
respondent identified with a particular ethnie group in Eastern Sudan. Respondents' 
region of origin was identified through a combination of questions. All respondents 
were asked in which parts of Sudan they lived.  Many respondents were also asked 
whether they identify with a particular region of Sudan. Sorne respondents were also 
(or instead) asked whether they would be comfortable identifying themselves with a 
particular  ethnie  or  tribal  group,  but  this  question  was  dropped  because  a 
considerable number of respondents preferred not to identify themselves in this way. 
The  sample  is  made  up  of  12  men  and  3  women.  This  imbalance  was 
unintended,  but  perhaps  unsurprising  given  that  there  seems  to  be  an  over-
representation of men among those  Sudanese in the  diaspora who  are  involved in 
political activities. The sample is mostly made up of people who left Sudan as adults 
167 The nature  of the  organization  and  potential  bias es  relating to  my  affiliations  are  discussed in 
section 3.4. 53 
and who are now in their thirties or older (  only two respondents are young er, in their 
early-to-mid  20s,  having  left  Sudan as  children).  Similar to  the  overall  Sudanese 
diaspora,  most respondents  (12  of 15)  came  to  Canada  as  refugees.  Nine  of  the 
fifteen  have lived in  North America for  over ten  years,  four between five  and ten 
years,  and one arrived less than five  years ago.  Many respondents have now spent 
most of their adult lives in North America. The interviews did not examine economie 
status,  however  anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  the  respondents  tend  to  be 
disproportionately  among  the  more  economically  privileged  members  of  the 
Sudanese diaspora in Canada. 
Most respondents are politically active, presumably much more than the norm 
in the Sudanese diaspora. Since coming to  Canada, 11  of the  15 have been active in 
one  or  more  associations,  groups,  or  non-governmental  organizations  that  have 
political  goals;  and  a  number  of  them  have  had  leader'ship  roles.  Arnong  the 
remaining four, at least two have been involved in other political activities. Seven of 
the  fifteen  have  participated  in  a  Sudanese  political  party  since  leaving  Sudan, 
though in two of these cases that participation was described as being brief or as still 
feeling part of the community of a political party. 
Respondents  have a high rate  of consumption  of news  media  from  Sudan. 
Eleven  of  fifteen  check  news  from  Sudan  daily  or  almost  daily  and  only  two 
indicated that they do  not check news sources regularly.  Eight of 15  said that  they 
check three or more sources regularly. They mainly consult online newspapers and 
websites with discussion forums, and a few watch satellite TV channels from Sudan. 
The two respondents who are in their early-to-mid 20s indicated that they see a lot of 
interesting content through Facebook. 
3.2 The questionnaire 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted using the questionnaire that can 54 
be  found  in  Annexe  1.  At  times,  1 asked  follow-up  questions  other  than  those 
systematically used in arder to  clarify certain points or to better understand a given 
subject. The questionnaire was tested with the first four respondents. The subsequent 
modifications  mostly  consisted  of  removing  sorne  questions,  making  minor 
modifications to  the wording of sorne others, and re-ordering. Little relevant data is 
missing from those first four interviews or from other ones
168
. 
Two  interviews were done  with pairs  of respondents,  one  of which  was  a 
couple, the others being friends _ who requested that the interview be done together
169
. 
The  average  interview  time  was  approximately  63  minutes  per  respondent.  The 
shortest interview lasted 40 minutes. Four of the interviews were considerably longer 
than the others (significantly more than one hour). Eight of the interviews were done . 
in persan, at the respondents' homes or in cafes. The other seven were done by phone 
or by Skype. 1 used a voice recorder except with three respondent who preferred that 
1 take  notes  by hand.  All  interviews  were  transcribed.  All  respondents  will  be 
referred  to  using  pseudonyms.  Only male  names  are  used,  in arder to  ensure the 
anonymity of the three female respondents. The choice of pseudonym does not imply 
. any  characteristic  of the  respondents,  whether  in  terms  of  their  region  of origin, 
168 The final  question,  perhaps  the  most exploratory one,  was  omitted  from  interviews  with  three 
respondents  due  to  time  constraints.  This  was  the  question  of whether "anything  about living 
outside of Sudan [had] changed [their] views about political issues in Sudan?" Also, in one case, a 
respondent had a lower leve! of English-language skills and the interview was slower than usual. 
This respondent's answers were still quite clear and detailed, however in arder to  gather the most 
relevant data within the available time, this respondent was not asked 3 of the 12 questions about 
his attitudes, as  he had already given responses which had to  a considerable extent answered two 
of these three questions. 
169 In  the  case of the  couple, it was  not known before the  interview was  about  to  begin  that bath 
would participate. In the case of the two friends,  it did not seem appropriate to  refuse to  do  the 
interview together,  given the  circumstances.  The  pair interviews resulted  in  sorne  ambiguities, 
since it was difficult to  note when and to  what degree a respondent seemed to  be in  agreement 
with a point that the other was expressing. This was particularly challenging in the pair interview 
done through a Skype audio cali. Fortunately, in bath the pair interviews, respondents were very 
generous  with  their  time  and  each  individual  responded  at  length  to  the  large  majority  of 
questions. 55 
ethnie affiliation or otherwise. 
The questionnaire examined respondents attitudes regarding three themes: the 
roles of the Government of Sudan in current armed conflicts, the  roles  of Western 
governments,  and the  democratization  attempted  through  the  CPA.  To  understand 
attitudes regarding the GaS' role in current armed conflicts, 1 asked  respondents to 
describe "what goals the government of Sudan seems ta  be pursuing" in the conflicts 
in Darfur and the Nuba mountains. Respondents' descriptions of the goals of the GaS 
address,  among other things,  the  issue  of whether the  GaS  intended or  intends  to 
commit crimes  or  genocide or other crimes  against humanity.  1 asked respondents 
who  did  not  spontaneously mention such terms  whether they  "believe[d]  that  the 
ward genocide is accurate" in relation to  the early years of the Darfur conflict ("and 
why or why not?"). Attitudes with regards to  the GaS' role in the Blue Nile or Abyei 
conflicts were not examined, mostly in arder to  keep the interviews to  a reasonable 
length. 
To  understand attitudes regarding the  roles of Western governments, 1 asked 
about  support  for  UN  peacekeepers  in  Darfur,  about  the  debate  around  potential 
Western military intervention in the early years of the Darfur conflict, and whether 
during  the  interim  period  of the  CPA,  pressure  from  Western  governments  could 
have been more  effective  in increasing the  extent of freedoms  or human  rights  in 
Su dan. 
Issues  of  democratization  are  examined  mainly  in  terms  of  levels  of 
repression  of political  and  non-political  activities  since  2005,  the  extent  of unfair 
practices  leading  up  to  and  during  the  2010  election,  and  the  boycott  of  the 
presidential election by the most powerful opposition party (and sorne other parties). 
1 also asked whether respondents "believe there is any possibility that in the next ten 
years there could be a secular and democratically elected government in Sudan," and 
whether it is  "possible that democratization could happen in sorne kind of graduai 56 
and  peaceful  way."  While  these  questions  are  speculative,  they  provided  sorne 
opening to  explore issues  of  democratization with respondents who felt  that  there 
have been little to  no changes in recent years
170
.  Respondents were also asked about 
how often they check news from Sudan and how many sources they consult, in arder 
to  ascertain whether this is related to the political attitudes studied. 
3.3 Potential biases 
As  already  noted,  I  knew  five  of the  respondents  prior  to  beginning  this 
research project and the  other ten were  referred  through these initial  contacts  and 
subsequent  ones.  This  recruitment  method  may  have  introduced  a  bias  because 
people are likely to refer me to people they know well, and presumably tend to  share 
sorne attitudes with those individuals. While there was  nonetheless quite a diversity 
of attitudes among my initial contacts and other respondents,  almost all of them are 
opponents  of the  current regime in Sudan
171
.  However,  even  without the  potential 
biases described in this sectiori, one would expect a high proportion of opponents of 
the regime for two reasons. First, the diaspora is primarily made up of refugees who 
left  since  the  current  regime  came  to  power.  (The  regime  produced  a  massive 
outflow of refugees, especially through the brutal persecution of perceived opponents 
and their families.) Second, the regime appears to be fairly unpopular within Sudan, 
as indicated by the polis described in the literature review and by other sources
172
. 
170 Among  other  things,  this  last  question  can  provide  sorne  indication  of  the  extent  to  wh.ich 
respondents  believe  that  the  above-mentioned  issues  are  relevant  to  achieving  an  eventual 
democratization. lt is also an open-ended question that prompts respondents  to name other factors 
that they perceive to be important.  The question of whether pressure from Western  govemments 
could have  been more  effective in increasing  the extent of freedoms or  human rights also has 
sorne bearing on  th~ same theme of whether marginal changes  in civil liberties are perceived as 
being relevant. 
171 Based on their responses, all but one respondent can quite easily be identified as opponents of the 
current regime.  Even this one other respondent was  fairly critical of the regime on most issues 
addressed and gave responses that were mostly unexceptional. 
172 For  example,  historian  Robert  Collins  has  described  the  current  government  as  the  "most 57 
I already had contacts in the Sudanese community due to my past work with 
the  Darfur/Sudan  Peace  Network.  I  was  an  employee,  later  a  volunteer,  and 
throughout this  time one of the main contact people of this organization, for around 
two and a half years (2007-2010). The nature of this organization
173  and its positions 
on various issues shaped the kinds of contacts I made with members of the Sudanese 
community and can thus be considered as another potential source of bias. However, 
my involvement in issues of human rights in Sudan seems to have been very helpful 
in convincing sorne people to  share their views with me.  This potential bias should 
thus  be  viewed  in  relation  to  my  being  given  additional  trust  and  access  to 
information by sorne. During the consent procedure, I mentioned to  respondents my 
previous  role  in  this  organization  and  explained  that  my  role  as  a  researcher  is 
completely separate from any past involvement. 
It also  bears  acknowledging  that biases  might be introduced  by my being 
from  outside of the  community and being of a certain  socio-cultural and  religious 
background.  One possible effect of these differences is  that I may be perceived as 
being influenced by certain types of ideas, assumptions and misconceptions that are 
common in the West.  For example, there  is  a lot of contested,  misleading or even 
completely erroneous information in public discourse with regards to  ethna-tribal or 
Islamist politics (in general and in relation to Sudan). That said, this effect is likely to 
have  been  reduced  by  my  knowledge  of  the  situation  in  Sudan,  my  history  of 
involvement in these issues, and through the questionnaire. 
unpopular  regime in  the  history  of independent Sudan."  See  Civil Wars  and  Revolution in  the 
Sudan: Essays  on  the  Sudan,  Southern  Sudan  and  Darfur,  1962 - 2004, Los Angeles,  Tsehai 
Publishers,  2005, p.  149-170.  Sorne  describe  the support of  the  NCP by  their  allies  as  being 
limited and highly dependent on patronage. See for example International Crisis Group, 2011,  loc 
cit., p. 17-21. 
173 The  organization,  which  no  longer  exists,  advocated  initially  for  increased  Canadian 
commitments  to  address  the  situation  in  Darfur:  peacekeeping,  humanitarian  aid,  diplomatie 
efforts,  and support for the  International Criminal Court. As  of mid-2009, the  organization also 
advocated around issues affecting other regions of Sudan. CHAPTERIV 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Respondents'  lengthy  responses  provide  a  unique  data  set  from  which  to 
describe the nature of political attitudes in the diaspora with regards  to recent political 
issues. In addition to describing these attitudes, we use this data to  test whether there 
is  a  cleavage  of attitudes  between those  from  marginalized  and  non-marginalized 
regions of Sudan, as  evaluated in the discussion. This chapter is organized into four 
sections, the  first three of which deal with attitudes regarding the role of the  GoS  in 
the Darfur and Nuba Mountains conflicts, the role of Western governments in Sudan, 
and  issues  of democratization.  The fourth  and  final  section  of  this  chapter briefly 
describes factors other than respondents' region or origin that were evaluated to see if 
they might explain patterns in the data. 
4.1 The.role of the GoS in the Darfur and in the Nuba Mountains 
Respondents  were  asked  how  they  would  describe  the  goals  that  the 
Government of Sudan seems to  be pursuing in the recent conflicts in Darfur and in 
the Nuba Mountains. Respondents responded by describing goals and other aspects of 
the  GoS' role,  including  its motivations and  actions in these conflicts. Respondents 
were nearly  universal  in their condemnation of the  role of the  GoS.  However their 
descriptions of this role varied considerably. The issues most commonly addressed by 
respondents were the GoS' maintenance of the political and economie marginalization 59 
of peripheral areas  and its instrumentalization of ethna-tribal politics. Respondents 
also  offered a variety of perspectives on whether it is  accurate to  describe the early 
years of the Darfur conflict as a genocide. 
4.1.1 Marginalization and the maintenance of dominance 
The most common theme in respondents' descriptions of the role of the GaS 
in the Darfur and Nuba Mountains conflicts was that it seeks to maintain a situation 
in  which  these  regions  are  politically  and  economically  marginalized.  Most 
respondents  communicate  this  idea  or  a  very  similar  one
174
•  The  frequency  and 
emphasis on this type of explanation suggests that it is  perceived as  one of the best 
ways to explain these conflicts by those in the diaspora. For instance, Issam explains, 
referring to  the  GaS'  efforts  to  address  conflicts by military means,  that the  Nuba 
Mountains returned to  conflict in 2011 because "the only option that [the leadership 
of the GaS] had is  to  control the country; and to  control the country by doing what 
they  did  and what  they  are  doing in  Darfur.  These  are  the  same  issues  of  social 
injustice and of marginalization." Ibrahim suggested that the GaS wants to make an 
example of Darfur:  "[the  GaS]  doesn't want other places in  Sudan  to  go  dawn the 
same path that Darfur went dawn, to  ask for  what Darfur people ask for,  which is 
their share in wealth and  their share in authority." Similarly, Khamis inqicates that 
the GaS seeks to simply maintain its control over the centre: "I don't think [the GaS 
has] any goal, but if there is one thing they try to assure is just to keep a buffer zone. 
That this war should not infiltrate into the centre. Either in the Nuba Mountains or in 
Darfur  ... As long as  they're fighting there,  we  don't care.  It's not the war itself,  it's 
now to keep the centre." Khamis went on to  tie this notion of keeping the centre to 
the regime's concentration of economie development activities in central areas. 
174 Four respondents talk explicitly about "marginalization",  "marginalized  areas" or the dominance 
of the "centre." Five give various other descriptions of how the GoS seeks to maintain an unequal 
distribution of wealth and power. 60 
Sorne respondents mentioned marginalization in reference to  historical roots 
of these conflicts, suggesting that these historical factors influence the GaS' current 
intentions and actions. For example, Sulayma:n explains that "the Riverain areas have 
to maintain their dominance. [  ...  ] In 2003 when the problem erupted [in Darfur], they 
saw that if they don't crush these movements, they might eventually end up having to 
share  wealth  and  power  and  that  kind  of  thing."  Makki  similarly  suggests  that 
"neglect  is  the  cause. of  the  various  conflicts.  [  ... ]  Historically,  certain  groups 
dominate.  At  the  time  of  iodependence  they  had  money  and  education.  After 
independence they didn't focus  on marginalized areas - they focused on Khartoum 
and central Sudan." 
4.1.2 Genocide 
There has been a prominent debate  around whether genocide took place in 
Darfur, mainly in relation to  the  events  of 2003 and 2004, but also  sometimes in 
relation  to  events  from  2005  onwards.  There  is  a  much  less  visible  debate  over 
whether genocide is  taking place in the  Nuba Mountains since 2011: this term was 
common  among  respondents.  Before  being  prompted  to  address  the  notion  of 
genocide, five respondents made such allegations, three of which were in relation to 
the situation in the Nuba Mountains. For example, Adam stated that "it's a genocide. 
They're using chemical weapons. They're using Antonovs [hambers].  They're using 
bombs against civilian people. They're making them starve. There is no right to basic 
human life in [the Nuba Mountains]"
175
. When asked whether the notion of genocide 
is  accurate  to  describe  the  conflict  in  Darfur,. eight  responded  in  the  affirmative 
(including the five who had spoken of genocide without prompting). For example, 
175 There appears  to  be only a small  number of journalistic accounts  that allege the use of chemical 
weapons.  See  for  example Mike Pflanz, "Sudan bombing civilians and executing rebel soldiers 
says  leaked UN  report,"  The  Telegraph,  London,  17  July  2011,  accessed  25  July  2012  from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/sudan/8643842/Sudan-
bombing-civilians-and-executing-rebel-soldiers-says-leaked-UN-report.html 61 
Gamal says "I think it's accurate because if the government supports certain ethnie 
groups against others, I don't know how you can describe that other than genocide." 
Respondents' allegations of genocide were almost all qualified in significant 
ways. For example, Sulayman indicated that the GoS has perpetrated genocide, and 
later describes its goal as follows: 
"The goal  is three things:  number one, that people will be on the run, away 
from  the centre of where they can  have a response,  away from  fertile  a  reas 
to  be  occupied;  number two,  that they will change  the  demography of the 
area;  number  three,  they  will  use  the  divide  and  conquer  tactics  to  keep 
people fighting with each other"
176
. 
While this  explanation is  coherent with the  respondent's  allegation of genocide,  it 
summarizes the  goals  of the  GoS  in a way that appears  not necessarily genocidal. 
Absent from  all  but two  of the  eight respondents'  descriptions  of  genocide  is  the 
notion of attempts to  destroy or target a specifie  group  other than  "opponents" or 
"rebels." For example, Adam explains that "[the GoS] would like [civilians] either to 
leave [rebel controlled]  areas  and come to  the  goverment,  or  they will kill  them." 
This  contrasts  with  broader  debates  around  genocide,  referred  to  by  two 
respondents
177
,  in which there is  the  notion of acts  that intend  to  destroy a  group 
defined by a criterion that is normally ethnie, religious,  or racial.  Sorne respondents 
explain that while it is  opponents of the  regime  who  are being targeted,  there  are 
nonetheless  ethnie  dimensions  to  the  attacks.  Ibrahim  explains  that  "in  my 
perspective, this grouping is just pro and against the government. And it happens that 
176 The type of "demographie change" being referred to was contextualized by Sulayman in terms of 
government efforts  to  weaken and  displace  the  Fur and  their  giving  passports  to  people  from 
neighbouring countries. "They get people, [according to] UN reports, from Niger, Mali, Chad and 
they give them Sudanese passports. Sorne of them have been absorbed in.the border guards." 
177 For example, Yassin  refers  to  "the definition of genocide in  international law."  lt is  likely that 
Yassin and other respondents' are aware of common references to  the Convention definition and 
similar definitions of genocidal crimes being acts "with the  purpose of destroying" a group "in 
whole or in part" Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948. 62 
most people who are against the government are Zurqa
178
,  and most people who are 
for the government are Arab. Soit is a genocide, but with qualifications." 
In  contrast,  almost  half  of  respondents  expressed  significant  reservations 
about  the  term  genocide,  and  three  of  them  clearly  and  categorically  refuted  its 
appropriateness. Among them,  only Faisal called into  question  the  scale of crimes 
committed in Darfur, stating that "the international community blew things really out 
of proportion.  I  don't believe  that  there  were  300  000  or  500  000  killed."  Other 
respondents  acknowledge  something  to  the  effect  that  "great  evils"  took  place 
(Abdella) or that "l'rn sure that a lot of crimes have been committed" (Issam), but 
call into question the  appropriateness of the term based on whether it is  believable 
that groups were targeted because of ethnie or tribal affiliations. For example, Salih 
responded  by  saying  that  he  "[doesn't]  think  that  when  [the  GaS]  sits  dawn  to 
strategize and to make a plan, [that they] plan to cleanse this tribe and that tribe." 
4.1.3 Politics of Arab identity, "race," and religion 
The large  majority  of  respondents  commented  on  dynamics  related  to  the 
roles  of  Arab  and  non-Arab  groups,  as  well  as  religion  and  sometimes  "race." 
Conflicts  in  Darfur  and  the  Nuba  mountains  have  often  been  described  among 
academies along Arab/non-Arab lines, or in terms of inter-religious dynamics in the 
Nuba Mountains
179
. All but two respondents mentioned the above factors in  one way 
or another when discussing the role of the GoS in these conflicts. 
178 The term  Zurqa,  or  Zuruq  is  "a locally used  name  for  the  non-Arabized  population  of Darfur 
derived  from  the  Sudanese  Arabie  word  for  Black,"  and  sometimes  carrying  a  derogatory 
connotation.  See  Salah  Hassan  and  Carina  Ray  "Critical  Reading  Darfur  and  the  Crisis  of 
Governance  in  Sudan,"  in  Salah  Hassan  and  Carina  Ray  (eds.),  Darfur  and  the  Crisis  of 
Governance in Sudan, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2009, p.  19. 
179 As  discussed in Chapter I,  the  Nuba Mountains has  a sizablë minority of Christians and  other 
non-Muslims. The religious diversity of the region was at times used overtly by the GoS to justify 
brutal war-time strategies during the second Sudanese civil war. See Johnston, 2011,  op. cit., p. 
133. 
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Most respondents  suggested that the  GaS  divides  people  according  to  any 
criteria that rnight strengthen their position or weaken their opponents. Favouritisrn 
towards certain groups, whether presented in terrns of "racial" or religious dynarnics, 
tribal politics, or Arab identities were usually explained as being instrurnentalized by 
the GaS. A fairly typical explanation, offered by Eissa, was that "if they're not using 
race, they use religion [  ...  ] They use whatever they can. They divide and divide and 
divide." Another respondent sirnilarly explains that "they kind of tried  to  separate 
people in that region into thinking that sorne of them are pro-South and  others are 
pro-North;  and have  the  conflicts  occur within the  Nuba Mountains  people itself, 
rather than its true nature which is  actually the Northern governrnent trying to  gain 
more control over .that territory" (Abdella). 
A rninority of respondents indicated that the GaS consistently favours certain 
groups. 
"The  government  is  dividing  people  by Arab  or African  descent.  This 
regime believes only in power- destroying opposition in  ali its forms.  This 
hasn't worked,  usihg  ali  m ~asures to  crush  any opposition  by  force  [. .. ] 
They are also trying to  convince certain groups to join the government by 
giving them money and offering them things." (Makki) 
Sorne  allegations  of  ethna-tribal  favouritisrn  of the  GaS  are  made  in  relation  to 
Darfur, where the GaS  bas  taken significant rneasures  to  increase the  rnilitary and 
poli  tic al power of sorne, if not most Ar  ab tribes, since at least the la te 1990s 
180
.  Sorne 
such policies were explicitly rnentioned by three  respondents, two of whorn  (bath 
from Darfur,  Sulayrnan and Khamis) refer to  atternpts to  "change the  dernography" 
of the region by giving citizenship to Arab immigrants from countries in the region. 
Sulayrnan  situated this  goal  of the  GaS  arnong  two  others:  displacernent and  the 
creation of divisions. Kharnis explained that the GaS sees non-Arab tribes in various 
regions as creating troubles for them, and "just wants to dorninate those areas." 
180 See the Chapter 1 of this document and Flint and DeWaal, 2008, op.  cit., p. 33-70. 64 
A sizable minority indicated ·  that certain religious, ethnie, or "racial" factors 
are  important  to  consider in relation to  the  Nuba Mountains.  For example,  Faisal 
stated that 
"there  is  a historical  aspect  [by  which]  the  Christian  mzsszonaries  were 
more  successful  in  converting  the  Nubas  to  Christianity  than  the  Muslim 
missionaries  were.  Even  those  who  were  converted  to  Muslim  sects,  they 
were th en converted to Christianity. So the re are legacy prejudices "
181
• 
Addressing a similar tapie, Badawi mentioned a speech by President al-Bashir (since 
the independence of South Sudan) in which he said that thereafter Sudan would be a 
fully  Arabie  and  Islamic  country,  and  that  there  would  be  no  more  speakers  of 
languages oth~r than Arabic
182
• 
4.2 Western intervention and UN peacekeeping 
Respondents were asked whether Western  military intervention would have 
been  justified  in  Darfur  or  in  the  Nuba  Mountains,  and  whether  the  UNAMID 
peacekeeping  mission  has  been  effective  and  appropriate.  For  most  respondents, 
attitudes towards Western intervention vary considerably depending on  the  conflict, 
the  time  period,  and the  type of intervention. The large majority criticize Western 
intervention, mainly with regards to  the motivations behind Western foreign policies 
and  their  effects.  Cooperation  between  Western  and  Sudanese  security  and 
intelligence  agencies  is  also  a  concern  for  sorne.  The  UNAMID  peacekeeping 
mission is much less controversial, though its effectiveness is doubted by many. 
181 Contrary to  what this  response suggests, there is  a large Muslim population in parts of the  Nuba 
Mountains. See Johnston 2011, op.  cit., p.  131-134. 
182 The  2011  speach by Al-Bashir  that  Badawi refers  to  could  unfortunately  not  be  located.  See 
however Peter Moszyncki, "Fears grow for minorities in North Sudan if South votes to  secede," 
The  Guardian,  London,  8  January  2011,  accessed  25  July  2012  from 
http://www.guardian.eo.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jan/08/south-sudan-
referendum-bashir-sharia-law 1 
1 
1 
1 · 
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In  relation  to  Darfur,  respondents  were  asked  whether  Western  military 
intervention would have been justified in the early, most intense years of the conflict. 
While  there  are  divided  attitudes  towards  many  elements  of  Western  military 
interventionism,  it  was  remarkably  common  for  respondents  to  agree  that  an 
intervention would have been justified in the early years of the Darfur conflict. Only 
three respondents rejected all forms of Western military intervention in this case
183
. 
Four of the respondents who indicated that sorne form of intervention would 
have been justified nonetheless  expressed major reservations. Adam suggests  that 
only a no-fly zone would have been justified. Another respondent, Faisal, indicated 
that  intervention  would  have  been  justified  but  that  a  "serious  threat"  or  sorne 
"limited"  intervention  would  have  been  the  right  way  to  proceed.  Another 
respondent, Salih, criticized those who call for a no-fly zone: 
In  my opinion, when you are  in  big trouble and you don't real/y know what 
you can do and you don't really have a way out-I guess what I'm  trying to 
say  - and  I'm  trying  to  be  fair  to  everyone,  I  think  there  is  a kind  of 
desperation in asking the Western governments to come and help us out. 
Later in his interview, when asked whether intervention would have been justified in 
the  early  years  of  the  Darfur conflict,  Salih  said  the  following:  " ... umm  ... Yes,  it 
[  would have been] right. Whether it's realistic or feasible l'rn not really sure, right. 
But definitely 1 think that could have saved a lot of lives." 
The large majority of respondents who said that sorne  form  of intervention 
would have been justified in the Darfur context were also  asked whether such an 
intervention would be justified where it to occur at the time of the interview, whether 
in relation to  the  Nuba  Mountains or Darfur.  On  this  question,  attitudes  are  much 
more  divided,  with  only  seven  respondents  indicating  that  such  an  intervention 
183 UN-mandated peacekeeping was consistently described as separate from (rather thanas a type of) 
Western military intervention. 66 
would be justified. The type of intervention that would be justifiable also changed for 
sorne respondents.  For example, Sulayman responded as follows. 
Still  we need a no-fly zone  [in  Darfur], because they are still bombarding. 
Now also  in  the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nife they also want a no-fly 
zone.  The  way there  could be  an  intervention  [as]  in  2003  [in  Darfur], 1 
don't think that would be valid anymore, but the no-fly zone is stiJl valid. 
A few  respondents indicated that a military intervention was necessary in arder to 
bring about a change of regime in Sudan
184
: 
1 do advocate for  a more peaceful transition or revolution, but we just don't 
see  that  change  in  Sudan,  we  continue  to  see  the  failure  of peaceful 
movements  and  peaceful  transition.  Maybe  outside  military  intervention 
would be  the  only way to  really see an  effect against the NCP  1 wouldn't 
want that to happen but 1 guess, 1 think it's the only way thot the NCP would 
be affected, by an outside military intervention. (Abdella) 
Respondents  voiced  a  variety  of  concerns  about  Western  military 
intervention, often painting to  the Western interventions in Iraq  and Afghanistan as 
disastrous  examples
185
.  Sorne  explained  that  positive  changes  cannat  result  from 
outside interventions, two of whom indicated that any Western intervention in Sudan 
would  rally  people  around  the  current  regime.  Faisal  suggested  that  "exogenous 
change  is  impossible  in  Sudan  the  same  way it was impossible  in  Iraq  and  it is 
impossible in Afghanistan; and people are starting to realize this." 
The most commonly expressed type of reservation regarding Western military 
intervention was with regards to the motivations of Western foreign policies. Mostly 
respondents  indicated that there  is  little  or  no  genuine  concern  for  human  rights, 
democracy,  or  even  crimes  against humanity in  Sudan.  Even sorne  who  are  fairly 
.184 It should  be  noted  that  two  of  these  three  respondents  nonetheless  expressed  opposition  to 
Western rnilitary intervention in most forrns or contexts. 
185 It is unclear whether respondents view Western rnilitary interventions prirnarily in terrns of US-
led  interventions.  The  exarnples  rnentioned  by  respondents  could  ali  be  described  as  such: 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. 67 
favourable to  the idea of Western military intervention hold such perspectives. For 
example, Sulayman explained that: 
I do  believe  that  intervention  was  necessary.  The  intervention  I  have  in 
mind  is  not like  what happened  in  Iraq  but something  based on  [the  UN 
principle  of]  right  to  protect.  Use  that  to  make  clear  if a government  is 
killing  its  own  people,  then  the  international community can  intervene  to 
create a safe haven for those people.  The Sudan issue or Darfur issue is not 
an  issue  for people.  The Darfur people are Muslims and are Black,  and so 
the world ignores this. 
Other respondents express Western interest (or lack thereof) mainly in terms of oil, 
as indicated by Makki: "[Western countries] said they intervened in Libya to  protect 
civilians, but there was not even a fraction of the  danger to  civilians as  [in]  certain 
conflicts in Sudan. But it's because there are billions in  oil,  which Darfur or  Nuba 
Mountains don't have." 
A number of respondents (n=S) pointed to  the West's collaboration with the 
Sudanese security apparatus  as  a major point of concern and  reason why Western 
governments have not put greater pressure on the GoS. As Sulayman explains, "The 
priority of the USA is security, fighting terror. I don't know what information Sudan 
is giving them, but this seems to play a huge role.  Obama knows what is  going on, 
but  there  is  no  will,  because  they're  concerned  about  national  security."  More 
broadly, it was often simply a lack of political will of Western governments that was 
invoked to explain their inaction: 
"I think  a/ways  since  2003,  the  Western  countries  [in  relation]  to  [the 
Darfur  1 conflict and to  [  other] conflicts  in  Sudan,  including  hu man  rights 
in Sudan, they were not up to the leve/, and I think it lacks the political will. 
And that  it  why  the  [GoS]  does  not take  the  threats  and  things  seriously, 
because they kryow they will not do  it. Because they do not have the political 
will to do anything on the ground.  (Ibrahim) 
Aside from questions of Western military intervention, respondents were also 
asked what they think of Western support for the UNAMID peacekeeping mission in 68 
Darfur.  None  of the  respondents  expressed opposition to  the mission,  though  two 
respondents  expressed  concerns  regarding  sexual  violence  perpetrated  by 
peacekeepers or corruption within the international force.  Sorne respondents doubted 
the effectiveness of the mission, indicating for example that Western support should 
have been greater. Three respondents, all from Darfur, went so  far as  to  say that the 
peacekeepers have been "useless," "not effective at all" or are "not doing anything." 
4.3 Democratization 
The  2005  Comprehensive  Peace  Agr~ement  (CPA)  resulted  in  sorne 
significant  shifts  in  the  political  landscape.  It  has  been  linked  to  a  reduction  in 
repression,  and  led  to  the  first  multi-party  election  in  more  than  two  decades. 
Respondents  were  asked  to  consider  elements  linked  to  democratization,  such  as 
changes in levels of repression, the fairness of the 2010 election, and changes in the 
GoS' use of tribal politics. They were also asked whether they saw any potential for a 
change towards  a democratie  and secular government,  and  whether such a change 
could  occur in  a  graduai  or  peaceful fashion.  This revealed  sorne  of respondents' 
beliefs regarding the conditions necessary to achieve democratization in Sudan. 
4.3.1 Levels of repression and tribal politics 
There is  disagreement over whether  there  was  any  substantive  decrease in 
repression around the time of the CPA.  Half of the respondents indicated that there 
was  a certain margin  or  space  of freedom  that appeared  around  2005,  at  least in 
Khartoum, particularly with regards to  freedom of expression and  the  inclusion of 
sorne  political parties  that had operated mainly from  neighbouring countries  for  a 
number of years. Numerous respondents gave examples of changes that were part of 
this margin of freedom. For example, Eissa explains: 
The opposition parties were not [parties  to the CPA] soit didn't affect them. ,-------~ ·~----
The  gov't didn't honour its  agreement with  the political parties.  To  be  true 
though, before CPA,  many people could not go  back.  We  could not go  back 
to Sudan.  There was no margin of freedom.  [After the CPA] politicians also 
went back to Sudan, and the newspapers started to open here and there. But 
the  election  came  and  that struggle changed this  margin  of freedom.  This 
margin  did  not go  that  far. Yes, you  can  talk on  public transportation  or 
whatever, but even ifyou are a big guy, you can still get killed or tortured. 
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Several  respondents  (n=6)  indicated  that  there  was  an  increase  in  freedom  of 
expression and  association. According  to  sorne,  there was  also  a  reduction  in  the 
frequency of torture,  arrests or beatings carried out by the  security services:  "They 
can kill someone in Port Sudan or Darfur, but not a prof in Khartoum as  they used 
to"  (Ali).  Yet  respondents  also  mentioned  cases  of  beatings,  torture  and  killings 
which occurred during the samè period. 
[A persan I know] was engaged in the women 's civil society movement. She 
was beaten two- three times.  [Another persan I know] went back to Sudan 
and  was  beaten  by  the  police  because  he  was  holding  an  American 
passport.  He  did  nothing  actually. Still  there  is  repression, still there  is  a 
ban  on  sorne papers, still people cannat make  their  activities in  a normal 
way. Still you  fee[  like there is someone behind you. People start to  speak, 
like at a gathering, a {east, when they bury someone, they speak their mind. 
Tm listening, but it is not safe.  [Adam] 
Several respondents mentioned that repression increased again leading up to 
and following the 2010 election and the separation of South Sudan
186
. The election in 
South Kordofan (the region that includes the Nuba Mountains), held a year later
187
, 
then  precipitated  a  return  to  conflict  between  the  GoS  and  SPLM-North,  which 
186 This  increased repression has been widely reported and documented elsewhere. See for  example 
International Crisis Group, "Rigged Elections in Darfur and the Consequences of a Probable NCP 
Victory  in  Sudan,"  March  30th,  2010  [online],  available  at  http://www.crisisgroup.org/enl 
regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan.aspx (accessed 25 June 2012). 
187 The election was delayed in this region due to  the disagreement between the NCP and SPLA/M 
over results of the 2008 census and over the boundaries of certain constituencies. See Muhammad 
Osman, 2011, "FACTBOX: South Kordofan elections," Sudan  Tribune,  10 April 2011  [online], 
available at http :/  /www.sudantribune.  corn/Background-briefing-Sou th-Kordofan,38531 (  accessed 
30 September 2012). 70 
further heightened the security concerns of the GaS. Approaching and following the 
separation of South Sudan, inflammatory rhetoric of the GoS against minority groups 
and in favour of an Arab and Islamic identity for Sudan seems to have been coupled 
with an increase in repression. As one respondent noted, "they think now everyone in 
the North is a Muslim, so they think they can enforce their political agenda. And they 
start with the women's movement, harassing them [about the] Islamic dress code"
188
. 
Eight  respondents  denied  that any  reduction in repression had taken  place 
around 2005, and three of them claimed that things have only gotten worse since that 
time. When asked about the return of political parties, one such respondent explained 
that the GoS simply wanted to neutralize those political forces - mainly the two most 
historically prominent political parties of what was  Northern Sudan,  the  DUP and 
NUP. 
Sorne respondents indicated that tribal politics are becoming more prominent. 
"[Those]  still living [in Sudan] kind of feel  that the  country went back 100 years" 
(Salih).  Given the myriad of military alliances between the  GoS  and various tribal 
groups, Khamis describes things particularly pessimistically: 
I believe there will be no country in  10 years. There will be no Sudan.  The 
country will disintegrate, no matter what. Just like Somalia, it's not going to 
continue like this.  You could have them sitting there and having control over 
Khartoum, and have the government carry the name of  Sudan. But in reality 
there  will  be  no  country  [. .. ]  When  everyone  has  arms,  and  even  the 
government is  not using  the  military to  fight  them,  you loose  sight of a 
national identity.  Even now,  I don't see  a nation.  I see  a  bunch of people 
running by the name of  a country, giving people weapons to protect them. 
Three other respondents also  mention the possibility that the  country could "break 
188 Women in Su dan  have  been defying the  regime's  laws  about dress  codes  for  many years.  The 
current regime decreed years ago that ali women must caver their faces when in public. See Hale, 
2001, loc.  cit.  Most women do  not abide by such rules, and this is  generally tolerated. However, 
there have been cases where is has led to  repression. For example, a journalist was beaten under 
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apart" (Sulayman and Eissa) or that they are unsure whether "it can stay one country 
with the  same borders"  (Gamal).  Sulayman explains  these  chang~s particularly in 
terms  of  the  2001  split  between  Sudanese  President  al-Bashir's  and  Hassan  al-
Turabi's factions of the ruling party: 
Those who remained in power no  longer trusted that the military would be 
loyal to al-Bashir instead of Turabi,  so they had to  resort to  tribal support. 
Now  it is whether you are loyal to a tribe that you can get something.  Wzth 
applications  for jobs,  they ask what is your tribe.  Even at the  airport they 
ask: "What is your tribe?" So it became such  that everything  is  based on 
tri be. 
The  Darfur  conflict  seems  also  to  have  further  contributed  to  a  dynamic  of 
discrimination. Two  respondents alleged that sorne  are persecuted based largely on 
their being from  Darfur
189
.  While Darfuris have long been underrepresented in the 
country's institutions, along with those from other marginalized regions, this type of 
persecution is unprecedented given that until 2003, there had been very little armed 
resistance by Darfuris against the government. 
4.3.2 The 2010 election 
All respondents except one described the 2010 election as  being affected by 
extensive unfair practices on the part of the current regime. Most (n=10) went so far 
asto dismiss the election completely, saying that it was "completely rigged," "almost 
like a jake," or that it "cannat be described as  free  or fair in any way". Others point 
to  extensive  corruption,  vote  buying,  and  fraud.  For  example,  one  respondent 
mentioned that he  knows  of a rural area in which a credible  opposition candidate 
(who had at least sorne known support) did not receive a single vote, according to the 
official results. 
Several respondents pointed out that "the West"  or "the Americans" should 
189 See International Crisis Group, 2010, loc. cit. 72 
not have accepted the 2010 election results. Sorne objected specifically to the actions 
of the Carter Center elections monitoring team
190
. Adam explains that the election 
has  been  secured  by  the  Carter  Centre.  The  Americans  approved  it  [in 
arder]  to approve the separation of the South. They close their eyes on this 
one,  and  ask  to  please leave  the [2011]  referendum  [on  the  separation of 
the South]  to  go  smoothly.  It's  a deal. Everyone  knows  thot.  It's  a deal 
between the Americans and the Sudanese government itself 
Eissa similarly summarizes the Western response to the elections as follows: "Forget 
about Darfur.  Forget about the Nuba Mountains.  Forget about  Blue Nile. Let the 
South secede first. The West is ·playing this game time after time." 
Despite  respondents!  almost  universal  dismissal  of  election  results,  eight 
respondents still thought that the SPLM should not have withdrawn its candidate for 
president,  Yassir  Arman
191
.  As  Sulayman  explained,  if  Arman  had  not  been 
withdrawn,  the  NCP  "still  could  have  rigged  it,  but  maybe  like  in  the  Nuba 
Mountains  case  it  would  be  more  contested,  and  the  whole  world  would  be 
concerned with the CPA at stake." A  few  respondents attributed the boycott to  the 
SPLM's focus  on the upcoming secession vote in South Sudan.  "1 think it's  a big 
mistake. 1 think Yassir as a member of SPLM couldn't understand the real political 
game on this front.  It was a game played by  the separatist people inside the  SPLM 
against  the  people  who  are  calling  for  the  unity"  (Adam).  Other  respondents 
190 In addition to the Carter Center's report,  respondents may be referring to  Jimmy Carter's  widely 
discussed comment to  a reporter,  after two days  of polling,  that there was  "no evidence of fraud 
so far as  [he] kn[e]w." See Sudan Tribune, "Carter election observer mission says no evidence of 
fraud  in  Sudan  poli,"  13  April  2010,  [online]  http://www.sudantribune.com/Carter-election-
observer-mission,34753 (accessed August 3'd, 2012), and Carter Center, 2010, loc. cit. 
191 Yassir Arman  was  the  2010  election  SPLM  candidate  for  President  of  Sudan.  Arman,  as  a 
respected  SPLM  figure,  a  Northerner,  and  a  Muslim,  was  perceived  by  many  to  be  a  good 
candidate,  especially for getting votes in the North. The SPLM was and continues to be headed by 
Salva  Kiir,  who  ran  successfully  for  President  of what was  then  Southern  Sudan  and  is  now 
independent South  Sudan. Arman  was withdrawn as  presidential candidate during campaigning. 
The SPLM continued to  contest ali  positions in  Southern  Sudan and ran many candidates in the 
North, for positions of governor, members of the  National Assembly, etc.  NCP candidates were 
declared the winners of almost ali seats in the North other than for governor of Blue Nile. 73 
similarly  expressed  dismay  or  at  least  disagreement  with  the  SPLM's  focus  on 
secession, which in their view detracted from potential political change in the North. 
Salih explains that 
"[with  regards  to]  the  democratie  and  progressive  movements  in  the 
country,  the  nomination  of Yassir Arman  and ali  that I  think  to  a  large 
degree  succeeded  in  mobilizing  a  lot of people.  It's  just that  the  SPLM 
decided to withdraw him  from  the election had a  negative impact...  In  my 
opinion the SPLM, at that time,  maybe they had made up their mind about 
separation, so they didn 't really ca re that mu ch about the election." 
Three  more  interviewees  explicitly linked  the  withdrawal  to  a  deal  between  the 
SPLA/M  and  the  NCP,  whereby  the  regime  agreed  to  make  secession  easier  in 
exchange for the withdrawal of Arman. 
4.3.3 Transition to a more democratie or secular regime? 
Respondents'  speculations  about  the  potential  political  change  in  Sudan  in 
years to  come were complex and included inter-connected themes such as  whether a 
popular uprising  was  possible,  the  nature  of political  parties,  and  the  strength  of 
Islamist and secular forces in Sudan. Speculations also related to  the sensitive tapie 
of armed movements, a subject that 1 did not address in interviews questions
192
• 
As  seen  in  the  previous  subsection,  respondents  expressed  considerable 
scepticism  about  the  impact  or  relevance  of  the  most  obvious  attempts  at 
liberalization or democratization in recent years. In their forward-looking comments, 
there is even less mention of a graduai change.  Rather, sorne respondents explained 
that  the  current regime  "won't allow  anyone  else  to  become  powerful  enough  to 
compete democratically"  (Makki), or won't "go out without a fight, unfortunately" 
(Abdella).  Respondents  mostly  talked  about  popular  uprisings,  rebel  groups,  or 
192 This can be a sensitive tapie rnainly because in  sorne diasporas, it is  common to  send rnoney  to 
rebel rnovements in the country of origin. 74 
outside military interventions as the only ways that the current alignment of political 
forces could change in a major way. Only two respondents indicated that a transition 
could happen through a "revolt from within" whereby political forces  close  to  the 
centre of power would come to sorne agreement to shift power to  parties such as the 
DUP or NUP.  One factor that was conspicuously absent from respondents' forward-
looking remarks was the notion that a significant change in the alignment of political 
forces  could  occur  as  the  result  of a  negotiated  agreement between the  NCP  and 
opposition poli  ti cal parties (or re bel groups). No one suggested that su ch a settlement 
could potentially lead to democratization or a change of regime. 
The most common suggestion (n=7)  of how the  regime  could leave  power 
was  through  a  popular  uprising,  due  to  the  difficult  situation  in  the  cities  (high 
inflation,  widespread unemployment,  etc.).  "People in  all  the  cities  are  very upset 
and the situation is explosive. Graduates are not working, there are no jobs, inflation 
is  so  high.  How is  it going  to  go?" (Eissa), Other respondents  mentioned military 
spending, rural famine, and even 
"the  problem  with  expression  [and  the]  right  of organization.  Thot 
whenever  someone  express  their  opinion  they  are  arrested  and  tortured. 
Still people are tortured. Still people are imprisoned.  So ali of these are the 
right conditions for uprising to happen." (Ibrahim). 
Several  (n=4)  mentioned the  role  of civil  society  or  grassroots  groups,  generally 
placing  a  strong  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  such  groups  in  any  attempted 
democratization. For example, Issam stated that for democratization to occur, 
it needs  a lot of efforts  in  terms  of the work seriously to  organize people, 
organize  being  active  in  the  trade  unions, being  active  in  the  civil society 
organizations and  try  to  really address  the  concerns of the  people.  This  is 
not only the  concerns  of the  role of the politicians  and  the opposition  but 
also  the  role  of the  people  from  the  communities  itself,  you  know,  those 
grassroots people. 
Sorne believed that political parties could also have a positive role to  play in the event of a transition. 
"[The  regime]  has  changed society, really.  The  country that we  know  has 
changed total/y.  Re-education might take  a generation ... People remember 
their oZ.d political allegiances though, so political parties could come back 
potentially.  They  could come back and  fill  the  vacuum  [in  the  event of a 
transition].  [The  long-time  leaders  of the  Umma  and  DUP  parties]  are 
alive.  I think there  will  be  something  there.  They  didn't  torture  people  in 
jail, at [east.  They could make a come-back. " [Ali] 
75 
Four other respondents also revealed that they have positive views towards (at least 
certain)  political  parties  (out  of the  twelve  respondents  who  mention  the  role  of 
political parties). For example, alluding to  the role of the diaspora, Yassin mentioned 
that "there are different reasons that [Sudan] is still behind [other countries], but we 
still  have  hope.  Not only  hope  but different  people  are  working  now  outside  the 
country in  different political parties and  movements."  In  contrast,  others displayed 
negative  attitudes  towards  political  parties,  particularly  expressing  doubts  about 
commitments  to  secularism.  These  later  respondents  and  sorne  others  expressed 
concerns  about  the  DUP  and  NUP  adopting  an  Islamist  discourse  or  being 
increasingly unwilling to  show support for secularism. Three respondents expressed 
clearly that these two parties are "part of the problem" or even "the other side of the 
same coin" (referring to the current NCP regime). 
When  asked  about  the  possibility  of  a  secular  government  in  Sudan, 
respondents  emphasized how  difficult  this  would  be  to  achieve.  Two  respondents 
noted that outside of war zones, the strongest opponent of the regime is  perhaps the 
(Islamist)  PCP,  associated with  Hassan al-Tura  bi, who  was  considered to  be  more 
powerful  than  al-Bashir  himself  until  they  came  into  conflict  in  1996-1999
193
. 
Furthermore,  the  strongest military  force  in Darfur,  JEM,  is  considered  to  be  an 
193 Collins 2008, op. cit., p.  194-228. 76 
Islamic  group,  and  is  thought to  have  links  with  al-Turabi
194
.  It  has  already been 
noted that Islamist discourse has also had a considerable influence on the DUP and 
NUP, as well as on many people in Sudan. Sorne politicalleaders talk about the need 
for a 'civil state' rather than a 'secular' one; and the most powerful current alliance of 
rebel  groups,  the  SRF,  avoided  referring  to  secularism  or  to  Sharia  law  in  its 
founding declaration, apparently as result of a compromise with JEM
195
.  Salih noted 
that "in the minds of the people [in Sudan], it's almost like a taboo" to oppose Sharia 
law.  Similarly,  Faisal explains there is  a fear of "giving your enemy the  chance to 
name you as un-Muslim or a bad Muslim." 
194 It is known that JEM's la te leader Khalil Ibrahim was at !east somewhat close to Hassan al-Tura  bi 
before Bashir removed al-Turabi from power. While Ibrahim later ardently denied ongoing links 
to  al-Turabi, many believe that there are ongoing links between JEM and the PCP. See Flint and 
de Waal, 2008, op.  cit., p. 100. 
195 The founding declaration of the SRF, apparent! y delayed because of disagreements over the role 
of Islam  in  a  post-revolutionary  state,  summed  up  the  aims  of  the  SRF  as  including  "equal 
citizenship [and] liberty" but without making any more direct mention of secularism or freedom 
of religion.  See Jared Ferrie, "Sudanese Darfur Rebel  Group Joins Anti-Government Alliance,'' 
Bloomberg  Businessweek,  November  14,  2011,  accessed  June  26th  from 
http://www.  businessweek. com/news/20 11-11-14/sudanese-darfur-rebel-group-joins-anti-
government-alliance.html 
- 1 77 
4.4 Discussion 
A number of the attitudes described above are related to whether respondents 
are  from  a  marginalized  or  non-marginalized  region  of  Sudan
196
.  The  association 
between region of origirt and attitudes is particularly clear in relation to questions of 
genocide and of Western intervention. Arnong those who said that the term genocide 
is  accurate in relation to  at  least one of the  conflicts in  Sudan, seven of nine were 
from  marginalized  regions.  In  contrast,  the  large  majority  of  those  from  non-
marginalized regions either cast doubts on whether groups have been targeted based 
on a tribal, ethnie, or racial basis, or offered descriptions of the conflicts that did not 
mention genocide or a comparable term. 
Those from non-marginalized regions, in addition to less frequently believing 
that genocide took place
197
, were also less supportive of Western interventions. While 
there  was  a  strong  majority  who  agreed  that  at  least  sorne  limited  form  of 
intervention would have been justified in the early years of the Darfur conflict, even 
the range of opinions on this case is indicative of a divide. Arnong those who either 
opposed all  forms  of intervention or who  expressed major reservations about what 
kinds of intervention would be justifiable in this case, five  of seven were from  non-
marginalized  regions.  A  similar  pattern  emerged  with  respect  to  whether  an 
intervention would have been justified at  the  time  of the interview, in arder to  stop 
the violence in the  Nuba Mountains and  Darfur. Arnong  the  seven who  thought it 
196 While other factors were also analyzed, on! y region of origin merits discussion. Age and number 
of years spent in North America were not found  to  be relevant.  Sorne patterns in  the  data seem 
potentially  related to  Jack  of involvement in  political activities  and  low levels  of news  media 
consumption; however only four respondents fit this criteria. This number is too small to warrant 
further  discussion,  especially  since  only  three  of  these  four  have  a  considerable  number  of 
attitudes in common. Similarly, gender differences could not be evaluated because there are only 
three women in the sample. 
197 During the pilot interviews, the question of whether the term genocide is accurate was not asked. 
The two respondents from non-marginalized areas did not use the term, and were not prompted to 
explain whether they believed the term to be appropriate. 78 
would be  justified, five  were from  marginalized regions.  Unsurprisingly,  there was 
also a difference in the extent to  which respondents expressed criticisms of Western 
countries' policies towards Sudan (and towards Libya, Iraq, or Afghanistan), whereby 
sorne  of  the  strongest  criticisms  were  voiced  by  those  from  non-marginalized 
regions; this was however a difference of degree rather than of kind, as  criticisms of 
Western  government  motivations  or  policies  towards  Sudan  were  common,  even 
among respondents who were relatively favourable to Western interventions. 
There was agreement among respondents that the GaS is seeking to  maintain 
a situation in  which peripheral areas are politically and economically marginalized, 
and that this is a driver of current conflicts. Respondents also shared similar levels of 
pessimism about the likelihood of democratization in the years to come, and a strong 
majority agreed that the  regime "won't go  out without a fight"  (Abdella). Yet,  the 
regional divide emerges again when the issue of regime change was addressed. The 
potential avenues  towards  a democratie  transition mentioned by respondents  were 
Western intervention, a coup, the overthrow of the government by rebel movements, 
or  sorne  form  of  largely  or  entirely  unarmed,  popular  uprising  due  to  difficult 
economie conditions in urban areas. The likelihood of a popular uprising was raised 
by seven respondents,  five  of whom are  from  non-marginalized regions  of Sudan. 
Four of those who mentioned the possibility of an uprising also mentioned the role of 
civil society, sometimes in reference to  the work that would be needed to  achieve an 
uprising or other transition. These later four were all from non-marginalized areas. 
The  attitudes  associated  with  region  of  origin  were  also  connected  to  one 
another  in  an  additional  way.  Almost  all  of  those  who  talked  about  a  potential 
uprising were among those who  are least favourable to Western intervention. Issam, 
having  already  mentioned  the  possibility  of  a  popular  uprising,  expressed  his 
opposition to  the idea of intervention in the early years of the Darfur eonflict in the 
following way. "No,  1 don't believe that is  a good idea at all. Any intervention will 79 
not be  for  the  sake  of the  people.  [  ...  ]  Changing the  government of the  North  of 
Sudan has to be the role of the people themselves. Not an intervention." 
There were opinions that do  not appear to  be related to  whether respondents 
are from marginalized or non-marginalized regions.  For example, opposition to  the 
government of Sudan was extremely common, and attitudes towards the GaS' role in 
recent conflicts were very negative. There was  also  wide agreement that  the  2010 
election was rigged. There were also sorne differences that do  not align with region 
of origin.  Ethna-tribal dimensions  of conflicts were described in a variety of ways, 
most notably  giving diverging  explanations  of whether such factors  are  important 
aspects  of  the  GaS'  goals  in  these  conflicts.  Respondents'  views  of  whether 
repression had decreased around 2005 were also divided a way that appear unrelated 
to region of origin. Notwithstanding these later opinions, the pattern discussed in this 
section  lends  considerable  support  to  the  hypothesis  that  differences  of  political 
attitudes in the Sudanese diaspora with regards to current conflicts in Sudan, Western 
intervention,  and  democratization  are  associated with  origins  in  a marginalized or 
non-marginalized  region  of  Sudan.  Significant  differences  of  opinion  on  these 
subjects are associated with bath region of origin and with one another. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This  thesis  had two  objectives. The  first  was  to  explore  the  perceptions  of 
members  of the  Sudanese diaspora in Canada (formerly referred to  as  northerners) 
with respect to  current conflicts in Sudan and sorne  of the main actors involved in 
them,  namely  the  GoS  and  the  "West", as  well  as  with respect to  related issues  of 
democratization. Fifteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with respondents 
from  several  cities  in  Ontario  and  Quebec,  in  late  2011  and  early  2012.  The 
interviews  with  members  of this  little  known  diaspora  revealed  complex  views  of 
politics in Sudan, particularly in relation to  the  period which began with the  signing 
of the  2005  CPA  and  ending  with the  separation  of  South  Sudan  in  2011.  After 
presenting the views of respondents, the thesis proceeded to analyze their relationship 
to  a socio-demographic characteristic:  origins  in marginalized or  non-marginalized 
regions.  While  this  is  certainly  not  the  only  significant  political  divide  in  Sudan, 
many  works  underline  its  importance.  lt  also  overlaps  with  other  politically 
significant factors such as ethnicity and tribal identity. 
The results provide sorne support for the hypothesis that there is a relationship 
between differences of political attitudes  in  the  Sudanese diaspora and  origins  in  a 
marginalized or  non-marginalized region  of  Sudan.  Indeed  a number of trends  are 
quite pronounced in this  sample. Those from marginalized regions of Sudan believe 
that genocide has taken place and that Western intervention would have been justified 
in bath 2003 and late 2011.  Most of those from  non-marginalized regions of Sudan 
reject the label of genocide, are opposed to Western intervention of most kinds and in 
most  cases  6ther  than  the  early  years  of  the  Darfur  conflict.  Those  from  non-------------------~~~-- -------------------------------------------------------------------
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marginalized  regions  tend  to  indicate  that  a  popular  uprising  could  lead  to  a 
transition  in  Sudan  (which  is  mentioned by few  of those  from  non-marginalized 
regions).  They  are  also  more  likely  to  mention  the  role  of  civil  society  in  any 
potential transition. 
That said, there was still considerable agreement on certain tapies, including 
that sorne form of limited Western intervention would have been justified in the earl  y 
years of the Darfur conflict.  Respondents also  agree that the regime will do  almost 
anything to maintain itself and keep most of the country economically and politically 
marginalized. The fact that the expected divide was not apparent with these issues is 
most likely due to the nature of the sample. Indeed, the Sudanese diaspora in Canada 
is largely composed of individuals who fled repression. 
As  is  often the  case,  our conclusions are  limited in  part by  the  size of the 
sample  and  the  exploratory  nature  of  the  research.  Furthermore,  our  questions 
addressed the  specificities of the  Sudanese situation, which makes the results more 
difficult  to  compare with those  of studies  pertaining to  attitudes  towards Western 
intervention and democracy in more general terms. However, the results suggest that 
a regional cleavage is  likely to  shape diaspora's attitudes pertaining to  conflicts in 
Sudan and elsewhere in the world. 
It is  noteworthy that this  appears  to  be  the  first study to  analyse cleavages 
among political attitudes in this particular diaspora. For the broader study of political 
attitudes,  this  study  shows  that  the  notion  of  cleavage  can  be  useful  for 
understanding  the  politics  of  diasporas. The  results  can  also  be  applied  to  non-
academie contexts. For those who draw on expertise from the Sudanese diaspora, as 
well as for those who engage with members of the diaspora on efforts such as peace 
processes, the results provide sorne exploratory and explanatory data from which to 
better  understand  political  attitudes.  Those  who  support  political  activities  by 
members of the diaspora can use the evidence and conclusions in a similar way. APPENDIXA 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Initial questions about the respondent: 
1. For how many years of your lite did you live in Sudan or in South Sudan? 
a) In what parts of Sudan or South Sudan have you lived? 
b) [Only asked in cases that it was not already known.] With what region of Sudan 
would you identify yourself? 
2. When did you arrive in Canada and did you arrive as  a refugee or through another 
process? 
3. How often have you travelled to Sudan? 
4.  How often,  on average,  do  you speak by phone with people in  Sudan? And how 
often do you send emails to pebple in Sudan? 
Democratization 
5. To what extent did the Comprehensive Peace Agreement have an effect on the level 
of  repression  by  police  and  the  security  forces  against  members  of  opposition 
political parties and other people engaged in political activities in the North? 
6.  Do you perceive the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as having had any effect on 
other  areas  of human  rights  in  the  North  such  as  freedom  from  discrimination, 
freedom of cultural and religious practices, or people's ability to  get justice from the 
courts? 
7. How would you describe the election of the President of Sudan and of Members of 
the  National Assembly in April  2010?  To  what extent were  there  unfair  practices 
leading up to or during this election? 
a) Do you believe that it was a good decision by the SPLM to boycott the election 
for President of Sudan (by withdrawing Yasir Arman as a candidate before the ---------------------------- - ------ - ------------------
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election)? 
8. At the state level and at the locallevel within Northern Sudan, were the elections 
of April  2010  any  more  or  less  free  or  fair  when  compared  to  the  election  of 
members of the National Assembly? 
9. Do you believe that there is any possibility that in the next 10 years there could be 
a secular and democratically elected government in (Northern) Sudan? 
a) Is it possible that democratization could happen in sorne kind of graduai and 
peaceful way? 
10.  Since 2005, do you perceive there to have been any change in the representation 
of ethnie and tribal groups that have historically been under-represented within the 
civil service or among the leadership of political parties? 
11.  Sorne  people  have  indicated that there  should  have  been  more  pressure  from 
Western  governments  during  the  transition  period  on  the  issue  of  freedoms  and 
hurnan rights within Northern Sudan. Do you believe that this kind of pressure from 
Western governments can be effective in increasing the extent of freedoms? 
Conflicts 
12.  How would you describe  the  goals  that the  Government of  Sudan seems to  be 
pursuing in the Nuba Mountains since May [of 2011]? 
13.  How would you describe  the  goals that the  Government of Sudan seems to  be 
pursuing in Darfur since 2003? 
a) [Follow-up question for when the notion of genocide is not mentioned in the 
answer to the above question] Sorne people have described the early years of the 
Darfur conflict as genocide. Do you believe that the ward genocide is accurate 
and why or why not? 
14.  Do  you believe it is  possible that Darfur or any other region could become an 
independentcountry? 
Western governments' roles in Su  dan 
15.  What  do  you  think  of  the  support  of  Western  governments  for  the  UN 
peacekeeping mission in Darfur? [If clarification is needed: "Has Western support for 
UN peacekeeping been an  effective  and  appropriate way for  Western countries to 
respond to the situation?"] 
16. Do you believe that Western countries should have intervened militarily in Darfur 
in the first two or three years of this conflict? 84 
a) [Follow-up question for those who answer affirmatively to the question above] 
Do you believe that there should be sorne kind of military intervention by 
Western governments at the current time, in Darfur or in other regions? 
Final questions about the respondent 
17.  How often  do  you  read  newspapers  or  watch  television news  from  Sudan or 
South Sudan? 
a) How many different sources of news do you check regularly? 
18.  Have you participated in any Sudanese political party since you've been in the 
diaspora? l'rn not asking that you tell me which one. 
19.  Do you participate in  Sudanese politics in  other ways such  as  voting, sharing 
information about political issues or being.part of any association? 
20.  In arder to understand and describe the perspectives of people in the diaspora, I 
am told that it could be relevant to be aware of the  ethnie or tribal background of 
people who 1 interview.  1 understand  that  this  can  be  a sensitive  question,  so  it's 
really up  to  you to  decide if you would feel  comfortable indicating what ethnie or 
tribal group you would identify with? 
21.  Is  there  anything  about living outside  of Sudan  that  has  changed your views 
about political issues in Sudan? 22' 
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